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The Color of Our Character: Confronting
the Racial Character of Rule 404(b)
Evidence
By Chris Chambers Goodman*
"For the present, individuals involved in the administration of justice
should be aware of the existence of crime related racial stereotypes and
their potential influence in the legal system."1 More than twenty years
later, the idea has not yet caught on.
Introduction
"I know how those people act."
"African Americans commit more crimes."
"African Americans are dangerous and violent."
"Latinos are drug dealers."
We have all heard some version of these generalizations,
some version of these stereotypes about the behaviors of people of
color in the United States. What we hear less about is the fre-
quency with which such stereotypes creep into the courtroom, and
subtly influence the decisions that jurors make. While stereotypes
play a role in both civil and criminal cases, because criminal cases
involve the substantial penalty of incarceration (and even a death
sentence in extreme cases), this article focuses on the pernicious
influence of racial stereotypes in criminal trials.
Some say that these generalizations are irrelevant. Federal
Rule of Evidence ("Rule") 4022 prevents the admission of irrelevant
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evidence, and so many generalizations will be kept out with a sim-
ple relevance objection. If the evidence does meet the low rele-
vance threshold, it may constitute character evidence, which is
generally banned from trial,3 and thus there is no need to worry.
If character evidence is admitted in a criminal case, it is because
the criminal defendant has opened the door to the use of character
evidence, and has brought the problem upon himself. Finally,
Rule 4034 provides safeguards against the admission of racial
stereotypes and broad racial generalizations as either of limited
probative value, or as unduly prejudicial.
This oversimplified response to the racial character of evi-
dence is leading to the unfair administration of justice in several
ways. First, character evidence is being admitted through the
window-without the defendant ever opening the door-through
Rule 404(b)'s permission of evidence of "other crimes, wrongs or
acts."5 Rule 404(b) permits evidence of these other crimes, wrongs
or acts to be used for non-character purposes including: "proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, identity, or absence
of mistake or accident."6 However, some of these articulated "non-
character" purposes actually rely upon a character-based inferen-
tial chain, and thus result in the admission of evidence that is
used by jurors as character evidence in violation of Rule 404. The
prosecution would prevail in this situation because the defendant,
for fear of opening the door, has chosen not to offer good character
evidence. Thus, the only character evidence that is admitted is in
the form of prior bad acts, offered ostensibly for a non-character
purpose.
The second concern arises when the criminal defendant opens
the door to admission of character evidence by providing his or her
own affirmative evidence of good character on a relevant character
trait. In fairness, the prosecution then has the opportunity to pre-
sent bad character evidence on that particular character trait. Ju-
ror studies have determined that jurors pay more attention to bad
character evidence than to good character evidence, and so any use
of character evidence can result in an overall detriment to the de-
fendant as soon as the prosecution responds with bad character
evidence. 7
3. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).
4. FED. R. EVID.
5. FED.R. EVID. 404(b).
6. Id.
7. See infra note 25 and accompanying text.
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The third concern is with the manner of proving character.
When the defendant decides to present affirmative good character
evidence, he or she is limited to offering that evidence in the form
of opinion and reputation evidence only.8 He is not permitted to
use specific instances. 9 Rule 405(a) permits the use of specific in-
stances only upon cross-examination o or where character is at is-
sue," which will not often arise in criminal cases. The only oppor-
tunity that the defendant will have to use specific instance
character evidence is in the unlikely event that he can cross exam-
ine a prosecution witness about that witness' knowledge of prior
good acts of the defendant. In most cases, the prosecution witness
will not be able to provide prior good act evidence, and even at-
tempting to elicit prior good act information on cross-examination
is an unsafe litigation strategy. 12 On the other hand, as soon as
the defendant opens the door by presenting some good character
evidence in the form of opinion and reputation testimony, the
prosecution will have the opportunity to rebut this good character
evidence with an inquiry into specific bad acts.1 3 Studies have de-
termined that specific instance evidence is more convincing to ju-
rors than reputation and opinion character evidence. 14 Here also,
the prosecution prevails by cross-examining defense witnesses
about specific bad acts once the defendant opens the door. If the
defendant does not open the door to their use to prove conduct in
conformity, the prosecution still prevails by using specific bad acts
under Rule 404(b) for allegedly non-character purposes.
Criminal defendants thus face a "perfect storm" of character
assassination, with the triple threat of character introduced osten-
sibly, but not actually for non-character purposes, bad character
outweighing good character, and specific instance evidence out-
weighing reputation and opinion evidence. The prosecution pre-
vails in all three instances. Thus, it is no surprise that most
criminal defendants refrain from opening the character evidence
8. FED. R. EVID. 405(a).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. FED. R. EVID. 405(b).
12. See L. TIMOTHY PERRIN ET AL., THE ART AND SCIENCE OF TRIAL ADVOCACY
312 (2003) (stating that lawyers should not ask questions that lose control, which
include "characterizations of people or events").
13. See MIGUEL MENDEZ, EVIDENCE: THE CALIFORNIA CODE AND THE FEDERAL
RULES, 494 (3d ed. 2005) [hereinafter MENDEZ EVIDENCE] ("if a party calls a good
character witness, the opposing party may cross examine the witness about specific
instances of misconduct by the subject that are probative of untruthfulness").




This Article evaluates the theory and background of charac-
ter evidence, Rule 404(b), and the racial implications of such evi-
dence to provide suggestions for increasing fairness in criminal
trials. Part I describes the quasi-exception mechanism of Rule
404(b), which permits the use of other crimes, wrongs, or acts to
prove something other than conduct in conformity. It goes on to
provide a brief critique of the doctrine of chances as support for the
non-character inferential chain of logic used to establish identity,
intent, absence of mistake and accident.
Part II analyzes Professor Jody Armour's contention that
forcing jurors to confront prejudices and stereotypes can prompt
less-biased behavior in their decision-making process. It also dis-
cusses that fact that when identity, intent, and knowledge are the
asserted non-character purposes for presenting evidence, the pro-
pensity inference is the most salient one, and thus the inference
most likely to be employed by the jurors in evaluating Rule 404(b)
evidence. This part then examines how a version of Professor
Charles Lawrence's cultural meaning test can be used to identify
inappropriate racial triggers, and to determine which racial refer-
ences should be excluded from criminal trials. Part II further ex-
plains how to identify triggers for positive behavior and how to ac-
tivate the non-prejudiced personal views that jurors may hold so
that these views supplant the less conscious decision-making that
occurs when jurors rely on stereotypes to draw conclusions.
Part III examines the ways in which racial references specifi-
cally, and character evidence more generally, are admitted or ex-
cluded under the existing Federal Rules of Evidence. Part IV de-
scribes several potential solutions. The first is simply to enforce
the ban on propensity evidence under Rule 404(b) by declining to
admit such evidence when the most relevant line of reasoning is
character-based, even though other non-character based reasoning
also exists. The second suggestion is to promulgate a new federal
rule, the Racial Reference Exclusion, to give attorneys a more firm
basis for objecting to evidence with racial implications. The third
potential solution is to adopt a different federal rule to expand the
admission of good character evidence (in fairness) when racial ref-
erences are deemed admissible in the court's discretion. The fourth
suggestion is that new form limiting instructions be used to acti-
vate non-prejudiced personal beliefs in jurors who may have been
exposed to implicit or explicit racial references, generalizations, or
stereotypes. Proposed additions to the Federal Rules of Evidence
[Vol. 25:1
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and draft jury instructions also are included in Part IV.
I. Background and Statement of the Problem
The character evidence rules substantially curtail the quan-
tity of character evidence that is offered and admitted in criminal
trials. However, the prior bad acts doctrine, which admits evi-
dence of "other crimes, wrongs or acts," 15 admits character-type
evidence on the grounds that the evidence is not being offered to
prove conduct in conformity with that character, but rather for
some other purpose. The fact that the evidence is being used for
another purpose is often lost among the jurors, which means that
the jurors can and do consider the prior bad act evidence for the
impermissible propensity purpose. 16 When prior bad act evidence
is coupled with racial references, stereotypes, or generalizations,
the propensity inference becomes even stronger than when race is
not a factor, and thus the courts need additional rules and protec-
tions for criminal defendants in these circumstances.
Consider a defendant who is charged with welfare fraud. The
prosecution seeks to admit evidence of her prior violations of wel-
fare rules, such as failing to report outside income and omitting
any mention of her live-in boyfriend. If the defendant is an Anglo,
suburban housewife in the process of divorcing her abusive hus-
band who refuses to pay child support, the prior bad acts can be
explained away with the argument that she was not familiar with
the complicated welfare rules.
If the defendant were instead an African American woman,
with several children who have different fathers, the most common
inferential chain would be quite different. The prior bad acts
would be used to demonstrate that she is not new to the welfare
system, and thus has some knowledge of the rules and limitations
of welfare benefits. Therefore, she likely used that knowledge to
defraud the government in this particular case. While this infer-
ential chain could apply in either case, the stereotype is triggered
when the defendant is an African American female with children,
and thus the prior bad act evidence is more dangerous in this
situation.
15. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
16. See generally L. TIMOTHY PERRIN ET AL., supra note 12 at 351-52 ("[Tlhe
jurors have heard the testimony, and despite a carefully worded admonition from
the court that they may only consider testimony in a limited way, the jurors will
use that evidence in any way that makes sense to them.").
20071
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A. Prior Bad Acts Are Excluded from the Character
Evidence Ban
The bad acts doctrine is based on the character theory of im-
peachment, which means that people who engage in bad acts are
less likely to be truthful, and therefore are less worthy of belief
when they testify as witnesses.17 Rule 404(b) specifically prohibits
the use of such evidence for propensity purposes, to prove conduct
in conformity with a character trait.1 8 Thus, under Rule 404(b),
the prior bad acts evidence in our welfare case is not admissible to
prove action in conformity with the character trait-that she is the
kind of person who tries to cheat the welfare system, and therefore
is likely to have cheated the welfare system in this case as well.
The evidence will be admissible to prove other important issues,
such as knowledge, intent, preparation, plan, opportunity, motive,
identity or absence of mistake or accident. 19 This non-exhaustive
list of permissible purposes is also known as "KIPPOMIA."20 The
prior bad acts here can be admitted to show knowledge of the wel-
fare rules, or absence of mistake as to those rules. In criminal
cases, the prosecutor must first provide reasonable notice of the
intent to offer prior bad act evidence for a non-propensity pur-
pose. 21 Prior convictions are a very common form of evidence, but
even uncharged offenses can be admitted, as long as the Rule 403
balancing test is met.22
In order to admit evidence under Rule 404(b), the judge must
17. MENDEZ EVIDENCE, supra note 13, at 46-47.
18. Rule 404(b) states:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of
mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the
prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance
of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause
shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce
at trial.
FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
19. Id.
20. H. Richard Uviller, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: Illusion, Illogic,
and Injustice in the Courtroom, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 845, 877 (1982) (creating this
useful mnemonic for the listed admissible purposes of Rule 404(b)).
21. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
22. The test is articulated as follows: "evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EVID. 403.
[Vol. 25:1
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engage in a three-step process. 23 First, she must analyze the pur-
pose for which the evidence is being offered. If the evidence is be-
ing offered to prove action in conformity with that character on a
particular occasion, then the evidence will not be admissible
unless it falls within the character evidence exceptions discussed
in Section III. Second, the judge must consider whether the evi-
dence is offered to prove something other than conduct in confor-
mity, such as one of the KIPPOMIA issues. If another such pur-
pose is discernible, and proper notice has been given in a criminal
case, then the evidence is admissible. Third, if the evidence is to be
admitted, then the judge will consider whether to provide a limit-
ing instruction based on Rule 105. Rule 105 allows the judge to
admit evidence when it is admissible for only one purpose, and to
instruct the jurors as to the limited purpose for which the evidence
is offered. 24 There is a debate over the usefulness of limiting in-
structions because some social science research suggests that the
judge is asking the jurors to do more than they are able.25
One of the listed KIPPOMIA purposes is to establish motive,
which may in turn be used to prove identity and intent.26 For in-
stance, Professor Mendez gives the example of a man on trial for
murdering his wife, and the admission of evidence that the defen-
dant had beaten his wife and accused her of having affairs. 27
Mendez explains that the evidence is not offered to show that the
defendant is the kind of person who would kill his wife because he
beats her (which would be character evidence), but rather to show
that the defendant had a motive to kill her.28 Because there are
numerous general motives for criminal behavior, such as money,
power, greed, and lust, almost any evidence can be relevant to
some potential motive. The real issue is whether the prosecution
can connect the evidence to a particular motive that would explain
the defendant's alleged conduct in this particular case.
The evidence of prior acts of assaulting his wife helped to es-
23. MENDEZ EVIDENCE, supra note 13 at 109-10.
24. See FED. R. EVID. 105.
25. Research indicates that: 1) jurors are more likely to remember the bad
things they hear about defendants versus the good, (2) past behavior is a poor ba-
sis for predicting future behavior, and (3) people tend to overestimate the limited
usefulness of past behavior evidence when trying to predict futuie behavior. See
MENDEZ EVIDENCE, supra note 13, at 57-59 (summarizing the research supporting
these findings).
26. Id. at 82 ("motive in turn may be used to prove the identity of the perpetra-





tablish the defendant's identity as the killer of his wife, because he
was the person who had prior fights with his wife. 29 This fact of
prior fights is probative of the perpetrator's identity and tends to
make more likely the proposition that this defendant committed
the crime, without relying entirely upon the impermissible charac-
ter generalization that because he is the type of person who beats
his wife he is the type of person who also would beat her to
death. 30 Similarly, in our welfare example, prior act evidence
about the live-in boyfriend is more likely to establish a motive to
defraud the welfare system (to support a new beau) with the Afri-
can American mother of three than with the suburban housewife.
In the wife-beating example, the evidence of prior beatings
could also be useful to establish the mens rea of malice, delibera-
tion, or intent.31 Malice is required for murder charges, and so
evidence that the accused has beaten his wife with intent to do
great bodily injury in the past would be relevant to show that he
did not accidentally beat her to death in this particular instance. 32
Thus, evidence of what the accused intended to do on other occa-
sions will be admitted to help establish the requisite intent for the
charged offense, without being used for the purpose of proving that
he is likely to have beaten her to death because he is the kind of
person who beats his wife. Similarly, evidence of the prior welfare
infractions will help prove that any errors were intentional and
not simply the result of a mistake. But let us examine this argu-
ment.
B. Misperceptions about the Doctrine of Chances
It is a standard evidentiary truism that the chances of some-
one accidentally or unintentionally holding a quantity of drugs suf-
ficient to suggest an intent to distribute diminishes with the num-
ber of times that this situation recurs.33 The "doctrine of chances"
and the "multiplication rule" state that, "when events x and y are
independent, the probability of the occurrence of both of them is
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 83 (providing an example of proving intent to kill).
32. Id.
33. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Use of Evidence of an Accused's Un-
charged Misconduct to Prove Mens Rea: The Doctrines Which Threaten to Engulf
the Character Evidence Prohibition, 51 OHIO ST. L. J. 575, 586-89 (1992) (describ-
ing the doctrine of chances which suggests that the more times an incident is re-
peated the less likely it is that its occurrence is an accident).
[Vol. 25:1
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equal to the product of their individual probabilities.."34
A coin, when flipped, will land one of two ways: with heads
up or with tails up. Of course, there is the very unusual, and sta-
tistically insignificant, third way of landing perfectly balanced on
its edge. The simple point to recognize is that each time the coin is
tossed, there is a fifty-fifty chance that the coin will land on heads
and a fifty-fifty chance that it will land on tails. 35 It does not mat-
ter whether you know how that coin landed on prior instances be-
cause the probability is always fifty-fifty. 36 Now let us examine
how this simple rule influences our assessment of human conduct
and Rule 404(b) prior bad acts evidence.
The chances of being involved in an automobile accident pre-
sumably varies with such factors as driving record, the number of
hours driven, the number of miles driven per week, the condition
of one's vehicle, and a variety of other factors that are too numer-
ous to address here. If we control for all of these factors, and find
two individuals, Driver A and Driver B, who have the exact same
safe driving record, we would expect Driver A and Driver B to
have the same probability on any given day of being involved in an
automobile accident. Just as in the coin toss example where there
was an equal probability of landing on heads or tails, there is an
equal probability of Driver A and Driver B getting into an accident
on any given occasion.
Now let's say that Driver A is involved in a traffic accident in
October through no fault of his own. That fact does alter Driver
A's chance of being involved in an accident in the month of No-
vember because the probability of an accident remains the same,
as long as all other factors remain unchanged.37 However, if
Driver A gets into an accident every month for four months, the
common sense inference from repeated accidents is that Driver A
must somehow be at fault.38 If Driver A is at fault in these acci-
34. Andrew J. Morris, Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b): The Fictitious Ban on
Character Reasoning from Other Crime Evidence, 17 REV. LITIG. 181, 192-93
(1998); see also EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE 5
(rev. ed. 1999).
35. DAVID FREEDMAN, ET. AL. STATISTICS 222 (3d ed.1998).
36. The fact that the coin has landed on heads for the last three tosses does not
decrease the odds that this toss will land on heads. Rather, over the course of nu-
merous tosses, the probability is that about 50% of the tosses will land on heads
and about 50% of the tosses will land on tails.
37. See FREEDMAN supra note 35, at 222.
38. Morris, supra note 34, at 201 ("[R]ecall that the relevance of the repeated
events-their force in affecting the probability of guilt-necessarily depends on the
assumption that each additional event decreases the probability that any of the
2007]
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dents, then we are no longer holding constant Driver A's driving
ability with Driver B's driving ability. When we change this cru-
cial detail, we would expect them to have different probabilities of
becoming involved in automobile collisions.
In much the same way, we expect jurors to determine that
"an accident" is not an accident because a particular individual
has been involved in several of them. However, probability is not
reality. While probability statistics are useful to predict and to
explain human behavior, the reliance upon generalizations and
characterizations leads to impermissible propensity inferences
when dealing with other crimes evidence in the category of intent,
absence of mistake, or accident. 39
In contrast to the coin toss, with human criminal activities,
there are usually significantly more than two potential outcomes.
The first is that the defendant will repeat his behavior from a
prior instance. The second is that the defendant will do something
other than repeat his behavior from the prior instance, which con-
tains a wide range of possible behaviors, and cannot realistically
be lumped under the label of a "second outcome." 40
None of these potential outcomes tend to make more or less
likely that he would again distribute controlled substances ille-
gally-unless we assume that his past behavior continues. Some
scholars criticize Rule 404(b) as an undue interference with a de-
fendant's right to a fair trial because "the prosecution is only re-
events was accidental.").
39. As Morris notes:
A closer look at the doctrine of chances clinches this conclusion. The very
process of eliminating (or reducing to a negligible level) the odds that the
charged act was accidental necessarily involves the assumption that the
defendant's character is constant. This is so because the bad act evidence
supports the finding of intent only if one assumes that the character traits
that can be inferred from the uncharged misconduct evidence are
continuing. We cannot eliminate that assumption and still treat the
accumulation of evidence of repeated incidents of misconduct as probative.
Id.
40. To put it more concretely, consider a drug offender who was caught with ten
bags of crack cocaine in the prior incident and claimed that he thought the sub-
stance was rock candy for his children. Outcome One is that the same person is
caught with ten bags of crack cocaine and he claims that it is rock candy for his
children. Outcome Two is that something other than Outcome One occurs, for in-
stance that he is not caught with ten bags of crack cocaine, or that he does not
claim that the drugs are rock candy, or that he is caught with more bags, or fewer
bags, or a different controlled substance, or no substance at all, but simply with
drug paraphernalia. All of these outcomes are "Not-X," or "Not-Outcome One,"
which means that this act is not what the accused did in his prior bad act. Never-
theless all of these potential outcomes suggest that he is the kind of person who
intends to distribute controlled substances.
[Vol. 25:1
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quired to prove that the other crime 'occurred' by a preponderance
of the evidence," and thus operates as a shortcut to meeting the
prosecution's burden of proof.4 1 The assumption that past bad
acts lead to unchanging behavior relies upon an additional as-
sumption that the past predicts the future, and can only arise
when propensity inferences are made. 42 When racial stereotypes
are considered, such as the stereotype of the "African American
welfare mother," past behavior is being used to predict future be-
havior. If we take away the predisposition evidence and decline to
assume that the accused repeats his behavior from a prior in-
stance, then the other outcomes are not relevant to the present
charge. 43
II. Considering Racial Stereotypes and Prejudice in
Jurors' Assessment of Prior Bad Act Evidence
Race overlays the propensity inferences often drawn from
prior bad act evidence in certain Rule 404(b) categories and has
the effect of producing a more vivid picture of the defendant. Pro-
fessor David Leonard explains that when prior bad act evidence "is
not morally neutral, the problems of the kind that the character
rule is designed to prevent may still arise,"44 and he cautions that
"if we are to continue to take seriously the rule barring proof of
guilt or liability by character, it is essential [that] the courts care-
fully scrutinize all uncharged misconduct evidence."45 When the
41. Thomas M. DiBiagio, Intrinsic and Extrinsic Evidence in Federal Criminal
Trials: Is the Admission of Collateral Other-Crimes Evidence Disconnected to the
Fundamental Right to a Fair Trial, 47 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1229, 1236 (1997).
42. Miguel Mendez, The Laws of Evidence and the Search for a Stable Personal-
ity, 45 EMORY L.J. 228 (1996) [hereinafter Mendez Stable Personality]; see, e.g. id.
at 227-32 (discussing studies assessing the predictive value of personality traits).
43. Returning to the coin toss example, when determining the odds that the
coin came up heads on a particular toss, we do not need to know any information
about the results of the past coin tosses. That information has no relevance unless
we are assuming that the coin's past "behavior" predicts the future behavior-that
coins who have come up heads in the past are more (or even less) likely to come up
heads in the future. The relevance is tied to the propensity inference, and when we
determine that the propensity inference is an impermissible one, then there is no
other ground upon which to support the relevance determination.
44. David P. Leonard, The Use of Uncharged Misconduct to Prove Knowledge,
81 NEB. L. REV. 115, 167 (2002).
45. Id. at 169. Leonard continues:
All too often, courts fail to do so when uncharged misconduct is offered to
prove an actor's mental state such as knowledge. It is easy to under-
stand the temptation to admit such evidence in light of the difficulty of
proving that which cannot be observed directly, but given the potentially
devastating consequences of trials, particularly criminal trials, a fair
2007]
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criminal defendant is a person of color, and the character inference
is not a morally or racially neutral one, nor one that is universal,
then these consequences take on a special significance. It is to
these special dangers that we now turn.
A. Becoming Conscious of Stereotypes Level May Help
Reduce Biased Decision-Making
Forcing jurors to confront biases, prejudices, and stereotypes
can lead to a more fair and just administration of justice by calling
into question the benefits of so-called "color blindness" in court-
rooms. As Professor Jody Armour suggests, adherence to the color
blind rationale "ignores a critical distinction between the racial
references that subvert the rationality of the fact-finding process
and racial references that actually enhance the rationality and
fairness of the fact-finding process." 46 Armour explains that the
focus on resisting unconscious racism has not been successful in
"lowering the high baseline level of anti-black bias itself."47 He
proposes "ways of activating nonprejudiced beliefs in jury mem-
bers to counteract their unconscious bias,"48 in order to challenge
fact finders "to confront their biases against blacks and members
of other stereotyped groups."49
Stereotypes are different from prejudices. Armour provides
these definitions: "stereotypes consist of well-learned sets of asso-
ciations among groups and traits established in children's memory
at an early age, before they have the cognitive skills to decide ra-
tionally upon the personal acceptability of the stereotypes,"
whereas "prejudice consists of derogatory personal beliefs."5 0
One's personal beliefs thus may conflict with or be consistent with
stereotypes. 51 Armour's proposal may be surprisingly simple, but
its simplicity is elegant. By priming the jurors in a way that will
help them to access their non-prejudiced belief system, Armour be-
system of justice requires no less.
Id.
46. Jody Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal Decisionmakers
Break the Prejudice Habit, 83 CAL. L. REV. 733, 735 (1995) [hereinafter Armour
Stereotypes].
47. Id. at 737.
48. Id. at 738.
49. Id. at 737.
50. Id. at 741-42.
51. Id. at 742 ("[S]ome people's stereotypes and personal beliefs overlap ....
However, many people have thought about the cultural stereotypes, recognized
them as inappropriate bases for responding to others, and deliberately rejected
them.").
[Vol. 25:1
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lieves that we can give those jurors the tools to fight the uncon-
scious bias or unconscious racism that otherwise seeps into crimi-
nal trials where the defendant or witnesses are persons of color.52
Armour describes an experiment asking subjects to consider
how they should act and how they actually would act in situations
involving the implication of various racial stereotypes. 53 The re-
sults of the study indicated that most people recognize that they
are prone to stereotypical behavior even if their beliefs are less
prejudiced than their actual behavior may suggest.54 The subjects
responded to the normative question of how they should behave by
saying that prejudiced behavior is wrong, and therefore acknowl-
edged that they should not respond based on prejudices. 55 How-
ever, the empirical question-the reality question-reminds us of
the familiar parental axiom: "do what I say, not what I do." Like
parents, these subjects realize that they will not always respond in
the idealized way. Like parents, the subjects recognize what is
good behavior (acting on their non-prejudiced personal beliefs) and
what is bad behavior (acting on stereotypes). Still, they were real-
istic in acknowledging that knowing the difference between right
and wrong does not also directly lead to doing the right and avoid-
ing the wrong.
Consider the dieter's dilemma: "I know I should not eat this,
but if I deny myself all the good things, I will not be able to stick to
my diet very long." Then comes the dieter's rationale: "Isn't it bet-
ter in the long run if I eat a little of the bad food, and break my
diet occasionally, instead of ruining the whole diet and just eating
whatever I want? Of course." With this internal debate resolved,
the fork then goes into the chocolate cake for another bite, and an-
other, and another.
Those who recognize that in reality they will not always act
based upon their unbiased personal views, and that they will
sometimes succumb to stereotypes, are likely using a rationale
similar to that of the dieter. They think, "I am not a prejudiced
person. I feel that people are created equally and entitled to equal
rights, unless they do something to lose those privileges. So, if for
personal safety reasons I chose to cross and walk on the other side
of the street when I see a group of African American youths ap-
52. Id. at 771.
53. Id. at 743-46.
54. See id. at 744.
55. Id. ("71% of the subjects reported actual would responses that were more
negative than their should responses ....").
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proaching me, that's okay, because it's better that I cross to the
other side of the street occasionally, rather than avoid all contact
with African Americans." Like the dieter's rationale, the stereo-
typer's rationale is based on a kernel of truth. For many people,
except perhaps those with the highest levels of personal discipline
and willpower, a constant diet with no break is not one that can be
sustained for a significant, or even sufficient, period of time to
achieve a weight loss goal. The kernel of truth in the dieter's ra-
tionale is a simple one and is based both on stereotypes and on
personal behavior-the truth is that many people fail in their diets
because they are too hard on themselves and cannot sustain a high
level of deprivation for a long enough period to lose the weight.
This truth is also a stereotype about the way dieters behave, and
our particular individual may have had some past experience with
dieting that confirms the "truth" of this stereotype for him.
Similarly, the truth in the stereotype-conducive response
about African Americans and personal safety is this: African
American male youth are arrested and incarcerated for violent
crimes in higher percentages (based on their numbers within the
local population) than are Anglo male youth.5 6 Note that the
"truth" is not that more African American youth commit violent
crimes because the statistical data does not support that common
misstatement.57 Still, the developing stereotype is that African
American youth commit more violent crimes, and are more likely
to commit such crimes. With knowledge of the kernel of truth in
the stereotype, it is reasonable for a rationally acting person who
is somewhat concerned about personal safety to cross to the other
side of the street when approached by a group of African American
youths. 58 Moreover, the "truth" of this stereotype will be based on
the subject's own belief-whether based on a personal experience
with violence, or the media, or something else-that the stereotype
contains a sufficient element, or likelihood, of truth, to be worth
56. JUAN F. PEREA ET. AL. RACE AND RACES: CASE LAW AND RESOURCES FOR A
DIVERSE AMERICA 1036 (West 2000) (citing CORAMARE RICHEY MANN UNEQUAL
JUSTICE, A QUESTION OF COLOR 37, 39-44 (1993)) (using 1986 data, at which point
Blacks within the population was 12%, one study found that "blacks were arrested
for 46.5 percent of violent crimes, and 30.2 of property crimes.").
57. See id. (noting another way to evaluate the data, which found "only 7.7 per-
cent of black arrests are for violent crimes, and 18.4 percent are for property
crimes.").
58. See generally JODY DAVID ARMOUR, NEGROPHOBIA AND REASONABLE
RACISM: THE HIDDEN COSTS OF BEING BLACK IN AMERICA 35-37 (1997) [hereinafter
ARMOUR NEGROPHOBIA] (discussing justifications for acting on race based assump-
tions).
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acknowledging. Studies have established the existence of a stereo-
type of African American males as violent. 59
Based on an experiment about self-reported behavior, Ar-
mour expresses hope that "[i]f nonprejudiced personal beliefs can
counteract stereotypes in this way, perhaps there is hope for com-
bating the influence of ubiquitous derogatory stereotypes."6o After
describing the results of some additional studies, he determines
that the insights gleaned from these subjects will aid in the devel-
opment of strategies "for activating the responses based on non-
prejudiced personal beliefs and inhibiting the stereotype-
congruent responses."61
Professor Armour is advocating the use of conscious thought
to break up the habitual reliance that jurors (and others) have for
stereotypical responses and behaviors. His definition of a habit is
'an action that has been done many times and has become auto-
matic. That is, it is done without conscious thought.' In contrast,
a decision to take or not to take an action involves conscious
thought."62 Armour goes on to explain that the findings demon-
strate that:
[Wlell-learned sets of associations like stereotypes can be acti-
vated automatically in perceivers' memories and can affect
subsequent social judgments. The effects of automatic stereo-
type priming on subjects' evaluation of the target person's hos-
tility are especially revealing in Devine's experiment because
59. Birt L. Duncan, Differential Social Perception and Attribution of Intergroup
Violence: Testing the Lower Limits of Stereotyping of Blacks, 34 J. OF PERSONALITY
AND PSYCHOL. 597 (1976) ("It would appear that the black man is imbued (stereo-
typed, categorized, etc.) with such salient personality properties (e.g., given to vio-
lence) that these traits tend to engulf the field rather than be confined to their
proper position ....").
60. Armour Stereotypes, supra note 46, at 744.
61. Id. at 745.
62. Id. at 754-55 (quoting David L. Ronis et al., Attitudes, Decisions, and Hab-
its as Determinants of Repeated Behavior, in ATTITUDE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION
213, 218 (Anthony R. Pratkanis et al. eds., 1989)). Armour explains that habits:
can operate independently of conscious decisions to break with old pat-
terns of responses and adopt new ones. Thus, attitudes and beliefs can
change without a corresponding change in established habits, resulting in
a conflict between currently endorsed responses and old habitual re-
sponses. Anyone who has ever tried to break a bad habit knows the persis-
tence of habitual responses in the face of decisions to adopt new ones.
Id. at 755. He further explains that because these stereotypes are established in
childhood before the cognitive ability has developed sufficiently to analyze and to
evaluate the stereotype, the stereotypes become "an ingrained set of associations
(i.e., a habit) that involves automatic processes. Nonprejudiced personal beliefs, on
the other hand, are necessarily newer cognitive structures that result from a low-
prejudiced person's conscious decision that stereotype-based responses to blacks are
unacceptable." Id. at 755-56.
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no hostility-related traits were used as primes. Thus, it seems
that the black stereotype must be constructed cognitively in
such a way that activating one component of the stereotype
simultaneously primes or activates the remaining closely asso-
ciated components as well. These findings also suggest that
even low-prejudiced subjects who have well-internalized non-
prejudiced beliefs about blacks have cognitive structures (i.e.,
stereotypes) that automatically produce stereotype-congruent
evaluations of ambiguous behaviors when subjects cannot
monitor stereotype activation consciously.
63
One possible explanation for this somewhat automatic behav-
ior is based on the "story model of jury deliberations," which sug-
gests that jurors "use their impressions of the defendant and
evaluations of noncharacter evidence to generate a set of alterna-
tive stories that explain the event(s) in question."64 Professor Jo-
sephine Ross evaluates the writings of Professor Andrew Taslitz
on the issue of narrative and storytelling in juror decision mak-
ing. 65 Taslitz's article describes how jurors fill in gaps based upon
inferences, and Ross explains that "[a]lmost half of the references
during the deliberations were references to inferred events, ac-
tions, mental states and goals that turned the trial into coherent
stories .... In the studies of mock trials, witnesses and defendants
were labeled and then actions were attributed to that person based
on the label."6 6 Ross asserts that in her view "the studies' most
striking implication is that if the truth is not provided, the jury
will rely on inferences and labels. These labels do not provide in-
dividualized justice. Instead, the labels are prone to cultural
bias." 67
We may wish to take the characterization one step further to
say that these labels are not only prone to, but are exacerbated by,
cultural biases. For many jurors, the mere fact that someone is
63. Id. at 758-59.
64. See Jennifer S. Hunt & Thomas Lee Budesheim, How Jurors Use and Mis-
use Character Evidence, 89 J. OF APPLIED PSYCHOL., 347, 350 (2004). The article
suggests further research, "such as investigating the interaction between character
and noncharacter evidence and investigating the process(es) by which [character
evidence] influences jurors' construction and selection of stories that explain the
events in question." Id. at 359.
65. According to Ross, the story model "supports the idea that good character
evidence could affect jury deliberations if the rules were changed. Assuming that
jurors do reason in terms of stories, the most persuasive evidence of good character
would be vignettes from the life of the accused." Josephine Ross, "He Looks Guilty"
Reforming Good Character Evidence to Undercut the Presumption of Guilt, 65 U.
PiTT. L. REV. 227, 256 (2004).
66. Id. at 255.
67. Id. at 256.
[Vol. 25:1
COLOR OF OUR CHARACTER
charged with the crime puts them in a category of the "other."68 To
the extent that the accused is also a person of a different race than
many of the jurors, the sense of difference is expanded. 69 Ross
makes reference to studies by Sheri Lynn Johnson, cited above, as
well as others to explain the conception that "white subjects tend
to assume less favorable characteristics about black defendants
than White defendants and that such assumptions contribute to
these subjects' greater tendency to find black defendants guilty
.... ,"70 Johnson also explains that "[w]hen the evidence is not
strong enough for conviction a white juror gives the benefit of the
doubt to a white defendant but not to a black defendant." 71
Racial identity also plays a role in the interpretation of Rule
404(b) evidence admitted for the purpose of proving identity. Pro-
fessor Colb raises the issue of distinguishing between cases involv-
ing the identity of the perpetrator and cases involving the nature
of the criminal act as a basis for different rules about the admissi-
bility of character evidence, 72 and her analysis provides some use-
68. Id. at 261.
69. Id. at 261-63 ("Jurors find it easier to consider a defendant as 'the other' if
they do not share the same race or class.").
70. Id. at 262.
71. Id. (quoting Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, in
CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE 181 (Richard Delgado ed., 1995)).
72. Sherry F. Colb, 'Whodunit" versus "What was Done". When to Admit Char-
acter Evidence in Criminal Cases, 79 N.C. L. REV. 939 (2001) (arguing that charac-
ter evidence is more useful in "what was done" cases and should therefore be ad-
missible in such cases, and inadmissible in "whodunit" cases). In explaining this
dichotomy, Colb states:
[I]n theory, every trial implicates both "whodunit" and "what was done"
concerns. Ordinarily, however, a defendant actively controverts only one
of these two elements and essentially stipulates to the other. In the
"whodunit" case, a crime has obviously been committed. An armed man
has entered a bank in a ski mask, for example, and ordered all customers
to freeze while directing bank employees to hand over cash. The attorneys
prosecuting such a case do not need to spend much time establishing that
the masked person in the bank violated the criminal law. Prosecutors can
instead focus their efforts on showing that it was the defendant, rather
than someone else, who carried out this unquestionably criminal act.
Id. at 948-49. Colb continues:
In the "what was done" case, in contrast, there is no dispute about identity.
The defendant was involved in the transaction at issue in the case. What
divides the prosecutor and defense counsel in such cases is the question of
what exactly the defendant did and under what circumstances. Perhaps
the defendant in a homicide case claims to have killed his victim justifiably
in self-defense. The answer to the "what was done" question will generally
turn on some combination of the defendant's state of mind during the of-
fense - mens rea - and what the victim of the alleged crime did immedi-
ately beforehand.
Id. at 949. Colb explains that "[iun short, most cases present either the 'who-
dunit' or the 'what was done' scenario, but not both." Id. at 950.
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ful insights regarding prior bad act evidence as well.
Using the robbery example, Colb explains that the character
evidence rules should be different in the whodunit versus what
was done cases, because "[o]ut of the universe of possible culprits -
people who are inclined to commit robberies - the jury sees only
one person, the defendant."73 She continues, "when the jury learns
of this one visible person's propensity for committing robberies, the
defendant's salience in the courtroom makes his propensity appear
to distinguish him from the crowd. This appearance is deceptive,
but can nonetheless influence the jury's evaluation of the evi-
dence. '74 While Colb uses the terminology of character evidence
offered for propensity purposes, her arguments can be extended to
include other crimes evidence that is offered for some other pur-
pose as well, particularly in the identity context. It is to that
analysis that this article now turns.
When the prosecutor is certain that a bank robbery has oc-
curred and the main issue of contention is whether or not the de-
fendant is the person who committed that robbery, evidence that
this particular defendant has committed other robberies in the
past 75 would tend to help establish the identity of this person as
the robber. But what is the chain of inferences that necessarily
must be made? First, we must consider whether or not there was
anything specific about the method or modus operandi of the past
robbery that can be connected to the charged offense. Barring
some specific outright identity link, the analysis becomes more
strained. The only logical inference from the fact that a person
has committed a robbery before, when the robberies in question
were not so similar as to identify them as part of a common pat-
tern or scheme, is the inference that this is the kind of person who
commits robberies. Therefore a charge against this person for rob-
bery is more likely to be accurate. This is the impermissible char-
acter and propensity inference that the jury should not use.7 6
If the prior robbery is offered into evidence, defense counsel
may object stating, "Objection, impermissible character evidence!"
The prosecutor will respond with, "This is not offered to show pro-
pensity, Your Honor, but merely to show identity and knowledge."
The defense attorney may then state, "There was no specific
73. Id. at 951.
74. Id.
75. For purposes of limiting the scope of this Article, we will set aside evidence
of prior convictions for use in impeachment, which is covered by Rule 609.
76. FED. R. EVID. 404(a).
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earmarking to set apart these particular robberies. The mere fact
that they were both robberies-a similarity of results-is not suffi-
cient to admit this evidence. Moreover, the kind of generalized
knowledge needed to commit a bank robbery is not something that
would set apart a particular individual. Thus, the evidence prof-
fered by the prosecution does not meet the standard for admissibil-
ity under Rule 404(b), and it violates the character evidence limi-
tation of Rules 404(a)."
Despite the eloquent argument of the defense counsel, many
judges will rule that the evidence will be admitted to show identity
and/or knowledge, but will give a limiting instruction to the jury to
consider the evidence only for that purpose. In effect, though,
when the jury reaches the deliberation room, its main considera-
tion is going to be whether the defendant committed a prior bank
robbery. Further, the jurors will have some corroborating evi-
dence to suggest that this defendant committed the bank robbery
in the current case. The strength of the additional evidence will
determine whether or not the "beyond a reasonable doubt" stan-
dard is therefore met.
Professor Morris also examines how identity cases often rely
upon an impermissible propensity inference, using a forgery case
as an example. 77 Similar to the bank robbery example above, the
evidence is relevant to show identity if we presume or assume that
the defendant did not change-that because he forged a check be-
fore, he forged the check in this instance, and that because he
robbed a bank before, he robbed the bank at issue now. 78 Even
considering the earmarking aspect of using the same name twice,
without the assumption of unchanging conduct, the prior bad acts
of check forging would not be relevant.79 Morris then concludes
that:
[T]he assumed continuity of the defendant's character serves
the role that the immutable nature of physical characteristics
plays in the physical evidence cases. Without this assumption
of continuity of character, we could not use other crimes evi-
dence for purposes of identification any more than we could
77. If the defendant is charged with forging a check issued from a particular
bank, with a particular payee name, and there is evidence presented that that
same person was charged with forging a check on that same bank and using the
same payee name at some prior time, then that prior instance would be offered to
show the identity- that the defendant is the person who forged the second check.
Morris, supra note 34, at 196-99.
78. Id. at 198-99.
79. Id. at 200-01.
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identify defendants by using fingerprints if they changed over
time.8 0
This assumption of continuity of character relies on the im-
permissible propensity inference, which is expressly prohibited by
the first sentence of Rule 404(b).81
An interesting case illustrates this problem. In United States
v. Jones,s 2 two African American men were charged with carjack-
ing and armed bank robbery. The prosecution repeatedly de-
scribed the defendants' carjacking actions as an "assault,"8 3 though
no assault charge was filed. On appeal, the defendants argued
that the prosecution's repeated use of this term constituted prose-
cutorial misconduct. The Seventh Circuit determined that this de-
scription was not improper given the facts.8 4 In contrast to the
facts in Jones, in a case where no violent crimes are charged, the
term "assault" could impermissibly trigger the black male as vio-
lent stereotype.8 5 Furthermore, in a case involving assault, if prior
bad acts are admitted under Rule 404(b) and are characterized as
"assaults," the stereotype could be triggered as well. When the
stereotype is triggered, the juror is more likely to create a story
consistent with that stereotype to fill in the evidentiary gaps or
uncertainty. This story can lead to a biased decision-making proc-
ess.
Professor Ross recognizes that the use of stories has racial
implications as well. 8 6 Stories that are more consonant with a ju-
ror's experiences will resonate more with them than those stories
that are unusual or uncharacteristic of the juror's cultural back-
ground.8 7 She explains that "[g]iven the inherent stereotyping
within culture, this constitutes a detriment for criminal defen-
dants, especially criminal defendants from unpopular groups.85
This helps explain why cultural stereotypes can have so much
force at trial."8 9 Race is often used as a predictor of bad character.
80. Id. at 199.
81. FED. R. EVID. 404(b) ("Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not ad-
missible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith.").
82. 188 F.3d 773 (7th Cir. 1999).
83. Id. at 778.
84. Id. at 779.
85. Sunnafrank and Fontes, supra note 1, at 11.
86. Ross, supra note 65, at 262.
87. Id. at 262-63.
88. Id. at 262.
89. Id.
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She uses the example of requiring a locked door to be opened with
a buzzer in order to let a potential customer into a store in some
large cities, (also known as "SWB," Shopping While Black), as well
as the more common suspicion that accompanies Driving While
Black ("DWB").90 She discusses Jody Armour's article91 and his
conclusion that "people may unconsciously attribute hostile or vio-
lent behavior to black men." 92
While a goal of inhibiting the stereotype-congruent response
is an admirable one, the real question becomes which steps will
lead us to achieve that goal. It seems that the first step is to de-
termine what information triggers the stereotype. Then we can
think about ways to minimize the admission of that information
into evidence in criminal trials where people of color are witnesses
and defendants. Next, we need to determine methods for activat-
ing the "should" behavior, instead of the "would" behavior. This is
the place where revised and reformulated jury instructions could
be most useful. Revised instructions would prime the jurors to re-
ceive evidence in a non-biased way, to filter that evidence fairly,
and to reject the lens of stereotypes that can be shortcuts to proof
for the prosecution, and result in a denial of due process for crimi-
nal defendants of color. Potential jury instructions are examined
in Section IV.
B. Identifying Inappropriate Racial References Through an
Evaluation of "Cultural Meaning"
Explicit racial references are easy to identify, and the exist-
ing Federal Rules of Evidence can adequately handle those that
are inappropriate. These explicit references will be obvious trig-
gers for stereotypical responses and can be curtailed through the
Rule 403 balancing test as unfairly prejudicial.9 3
The real concern is over how to address the less explicit allu-
sions to race and ethnicity. Armour recommends that statements
with stereotypical or racial connotations be carefully evaluated.9 4
He explains that, threatened by:
[T]he covertly racial tenor of such statements, courts need a
90. See id. at 262-63.
91. See supra notes 46-55 and accompanying text (discussing beliefs about
stereotypes in comparison to behavior that is motivated by stereotypes).
92. Ross, supra note 65, at 264 nn.158-59.
93. Rule 403 states: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its proba-
tive value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice .... " FED.
R. EVID. 403.
94. Armour Stereotypes, supra note 46, at 767-68.
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test of the symbolic significance that the culture attaches to
them. For to the extent that certain references carry racial
connotations, they constitute symbolic equivalents of members
of that race and thus serve as cues that activate (often uncon-
sciously) racial stereotypes. Thoughtful formulations of tests
identifying subtle racial symbolism have been developed by
Professor Lawrence (the cultural meaning test) and Professor
Johnson (the racial imagery shield law). Whatever tests for
identifying references a court adopts, fairness and accurate
factfinding require that once the court identifies the inappro-
priate reference, it should give the opposing party the choice of
a mistrial or corrective instructions. Given the enormous so-
cietal interest in racially fair legal proceedings, courts must
follow a policy of "zero tolerance" with respect to inappropriate
racial references.95
So now let us consider how to address implicit racial refer-
ences, the oblique references that rely upon inference and innu-
endo to convey a subtle message for the benefit of the prosecution,
and which inevitably results in triggering the stereotypical re-
sponse. Returning to the common example of African American
males and crimes of violence, a prosecutor may not invoke the ex-
plicit stereotype, but rather may ask the victim to testify about
why he felt threatened by the defendant to counteract the defen-
dant's affirmative claim that he was acting under self-defense
when he struck the victim. The victim's testimony may contain
such phrases as:
(1) "those people,"
(2) "just by looking at him, I could tell he was up to no good,"
(3) "he just didn't look like he belonged there," or
(4) "he was acting suspiciously."
These are a just a few examples, but there are a myriad of
other subtle references to race that do not expressly state the view.
Why are these phrases inappropriate? They are inappropriate be-
cause they trigger stereotypes, which are already ingrained in the
95. Id. The "cultural meaning test" is used to "evaluate governmental conduct
to determine whether it conveys a symbolic message to which the culture attaches
racial significance," Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 324 (1987), thus allow-
ing a finding of discriminatory intent, and triggering the strict scrutiny analysis.
Johnson suggests that racial propensity arguments are made on witness credibility
issues, such as "inferences that testimony is likely to be truthful because it com-
ports with the supposed propensity of African Americans to engage in violence or
not truthful because it accuses a white person of crimes believed to be more typical
of Black persons are racial generalizations that invoke strict scrutiny." Sheri Lynn
Johnson, The Color of Truth: Race and the Assessment of Credibility, 1 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 261, 331 (1996).
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minds of many jurors. Many jurors and lawyers alike would dis-
agree with this assertion and argue that there are plausible and
non-biased reasons for each of the above statements, and that they
are not based on generalizations, but rather are observations
about the appearance, conduct, and demeanor of the defendant.
When we turn to Professor Lawrence's cultural meaning
test,96 for example, the meaning of these phrases and statements
is plainer, and the translation of statements (1) through (4) above
is as follows:
(1) People of color, African Americans.
(2) He was a Black man who did not lower his own eyes when
our eyes met.
(3) He was a Black man in a White neighborhood.
(4) He was WWB, DWB or SWB (Walking While Black, Driv-
ing While Black, or Shopping While Black).97
These loose "translations" show the cultural meaning behind
the testimony, and trace the inferences that some jurors are likely
to draw-and indeed, are expected to draw. Through this mecha-
nism of coded language, inappropriate racial references are implic-
itly presented to the jury, leaving defense counsel without a firm
basis for objecting to keep the underlying evidence and stereotypi-
cal inferences from clouding the minds of the jurors. The implicit
message is sufficient to trigger the stereotypical responses and re-
actions, planting the bad seed that will grow during deliberations
and may conclude with a finding of guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. The final section of this article provides a new Proposed
Federal Rule for smoking out improper racial references that
would trigger the curative jury instructions to be discussed below.
C. Which Racial References Should Be Inadmissible?
Now that we have identified the implicit message in some ra-
cial references, the question becomes how to keep the implicit ra-
cial references out of court? Perhaps the preliminary inquiry
should be into whether these references should be kept out of
court. The main reason for declining to admit this type of evidence
is a concern about fairness for the criminal defendant. We do not
want him to be judged based on the color of his skin, but rather on
the actions that he is accused of. If the admission of this evidence




has a tendency to prod the jury into deciding guilt or innocence on
an impermissible basis, then the evidence should be excluded.
Where the implicit racial reference does not trigger stereotype-
congruent behavior, then the evidence should be admissible. For
instance, where the charged offense is accounting fraud, evidence
that implicitly referred to the stereotype of "African Americans as
violent" would not be likely to trigger stereotype-congruent behav-
ior, simply because violence has nothing to do with accounting
fraud (unless there were some facts in a particular case to suggest
violence as a motivation for the fraud).
However, the stereotypes that jurors already hold become
pernicious when the charged offense corresponds to a stereotype
associated with people of the defendant's racial group. These pro-
pensity inferences are more likely to occur when the crime charged
in some way conforms to the racial stereotype of the defendant's
racial group. One study has identified a link between race and
particular crimes, finding that "Blacks were perceived as more
likely than their [W]hite counterparts to engage in unlawful acts
of soliciting, assault-mugging, grand-theft auto, and assault on a
police officer."98
Ross considers the implications of stereotypes that coincide
with criminal accusations, and explains that when a study shows
that twenty-two percent of Whites believe that Blacks are more
violent than Whites, "[t]he stereotype that [B]lack men are violent
is problematic when an African-American man is charged with an
assault."99 Ross continues, "[t]he stereotype of the Latin-American
drug king-pin resonates all too well where the accused is Latino
and the charges involve narcotics."'100
1. Intent Relies upon Impermissible Character Inferences
As we have seen from the examples above, in certain in-
stances, the alleged non-propensity evidence is only relevant be-
cause of its connection to a propensity inference, and therefore,
98. Sunnafrank & Fontes, supra note 1, at 10. The study similarly found that
"[r]esearch participants considered it more probable that [W]hites would commit
embezzlement, child molestation, counterfeiting, fraud, and rape." Id. Note that
this study was limited to matching a list of crimes with people of different races
and did not involve open-ended interviews about these associations. Id. at 6; see
also Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REV.
1611, 1633 (1985) (noting that Sunnafrank and Fontas' study "results provide
strong evidence that crime-related racial stereotypes exist, but do not permit more
specific conclusions.").
99. Ross, supra note 65, at 264.
100. Id.
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Andrew Morris suggests, the ban on propensity evidence is a "fal-
lacy."101 Morris begins with the basic point that any evidence that
depends upon propensity reasoning is inadmissible, unless it
meets one of the exceptions described in Section 111.102 He focuses
on two classes of cases, where the asserted non-character purpose
is either intent or identity, arguing that in such instances the evi-
dence is only relevant for a propensity purpose and thus should be
excluded.103
Professor Morris uses drug cases as a primary example of in-
stances where evidence that is offered to show intent actually in-
volves impermissible character reasoning.10 4 When evidence of
prior drug sales is admitted on the issue of intent to distribute,
those prior sales are only relevant to the extent that they suggest
an "unchanging pattern" of drug sales.10 5 Morris explains that:
The earlier drug use, which is behavioral evidence, can be
relevant only if we assume that the defendant's behavior
forms an unchanging pattern. In the words of Rule 404(b), the
drug history is relevant only because it "proves the character
of' the defendant and supports the inference that, in the case
at issue, the defendant acted consistent with that character. 10 6
The basic point is this: unless we assume that the defendant
continues his past behavior, the past drug offenses have no ten-
dency to make more or less likely the proposition that the accused
committed the drug offenses with which he is currently charged.
Professor Ross apparently agrees with Morris' assessment
about such cases. 10 7 She gives the example of a drug case where
the defendant is found with concealed illegal drugs in the gas tank
of his car.'0 8 Evidence of prior convictions for smuggling drugs in
a vehicle was admitted to show knowledge, intent, and plan. Ross
101. Morris, supra note 34, at 189.
102. Id. ("To comply with the plain words of Rule 404(b), courts must refuse to
admit any evidence whose relevance depends on propensity reasoning.").
103. Id. Part of the authority for Morris' proposition is based on the view
adopted by English courts, which admits that the forbidden reasoning is often em-
ployed with prior bad act evidence and that it relies on a "direct inquiry into the
probativeness and prejudicial effect of the evidence." Id. at 206-07.
104. Id. at 191-92.
105. Id. at 191.
106. Id. at 191-92.
107. Ross, supra note 65, at 250 ("Professor Andrew Morris persuasively ex-
ploded the . .. myth, proving that evidence admitted to show 'intent' or 'identity'
relies on a propensity inference in order to establish relevance. For this 'other pur-





explains the inference from this evidence as follows:
[T]he jury is expected to infer that since he behaved badly once
before in smuggling drugs, it is reasonable to conclude that he
will behave badly again. The "bad act evidence supports the
finding of intent only if one assumes that the character traits
that can be inferred from the uncharged misconduct evidence
are continuing." It is targeted propensity rather than general
bad character evidence, but because it is targeted, it is often
more damaging than general bad character testimony. As
judges allow in growing quantities of evidence under 404(b),
the ban against bad character is further undermined. 0 9
In the intent context, intent to distribute illegal drugs raises
another example of the prohibited propensity inference, and at
least one court has relied upon this rationale in its decision, stat-
ing that:
Although the specific intent of the defendant was very much
an issue, the evidence of prior convictions was relevant solely
to show a much earlier disposition ... to distribute controlled
dangerous substances, otherwise unrelated to the offense in
question. Unless we are to hold, as some courts apparently
have, that proof of intent may always be shown by proof of
propensity or disposition, we cannot square the admission of
this evidence with the policy decision previously made and re-
flected in the rule of evidence we have approved. 110
Thus, when the defendant is a Latino of South American origin,
the "Latino as drug dealer" stereotype may be triggered, thus ex-
acerbating the propensity use of this evidence."1
In a criminal trial, where the defendant is an African Ameri-
can male charged with assault and battery, a juror with non-
prejudiced personal beliefs, according to Armour, would then say
to herself, "I am not more likely to find this defendant guilty based
on his race."11 2 But, that same juror, when hearing victim testi-
mony such as, "He looked suspicious from the time I first saw him.
I tried to cross to the other side of the street, but just then the de-
fendant lunged at me, and I feared he was going to strike me.
That's when I raised the cane over my head and tried to hit him
with it. When I missed, he punched me in the face, knocking out
two teeth," is likely to revert to the common stereotype about Afri-
109. Id. Ross recognizes that Professor Morris' analysis is not entirely applicable
to all types of 404(b) evidence such as a motive, but that it often does apply to in-
tent and identity evidence. Id. at 251 and accompanying notes.
110. Harris v. State, 597 A.2d 956, 962 (Md. 1991).
111. Cf. supra notes 83-92 (describing how the Black as violent stereotype can
be triggered).
112. See Armour Stereotypes, supra note 46, at 742 (discussing conscious rejec-
tion of inappropriate cultural stereotypes).
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can Americans and violence, and may presume that the defendant
was acting in a threatening manner and that the alleged victim
was only trying to protect himself from violence. 113 The effect of
admitting evidence with an implicit racial message ("he looked
suspicious") triggers the stereotypical response in even a non-
prejudiced juror, because he is faced with the opportunity to con-
firm the stereotype, unless or until those non-prejudiced personal
beliefs are activated.
The importance of this observation is made clear with a
counter-example. If the defendant was the proverbial "little, old
lady," a diminutive gray-haired, matronly figure, the alleged vic-
tim's testimony would be absurd and unbelievable to the average
juror. A non-prejudiced juror would be thinking "there is no way
this sweet little old lady could make him fear that she was about
to hurt him, let alone actually hit him, so he acted prematurely,
and this alleged victim is really the one at fault. Once he raised
that cane at her, she had no choice but to try to strike back. It's
just a lucky shot that she got him square in the face and knocked
out those teeth." Neither juror is prejudiced, but both are familiar
with the stereotype that African American males are more prone
to violence, and without a conscious effort to reject unconscious ra-
cial biases and to activate non-prejudiced cognitive decision-
making, the prosecution has provided a shortcut to proof. There is
no similar stereotype involving violence and "sweet-looking, little,
old ladies," and therefore she gets a fair trial in which the prosecu-
tion must take the full route to establishing guilt beyond a reason-
able doubt.
The stereotypes operate almost as presumptions, as a short-
cut to proof for the prosecution. For instance, the Sunnafrank
study stated that "[t]hese stereotypes might lead to a greater pro-
pensity for jurors to believe evidence presented by the prosecution
and a lower likelihood to believe evidence presented by the defense
when the defendant is a member of a racial group associated with
the crime involved."114 Because the prosecution does not explicitly
state the stereotype, but rather relies upon the familiarity jurors
have with such stereotypes, all the prosecution needs to do is give
evidence to trigger the stereotype, and most jurors will take over
113. See supra notes 83-92 and accompanying text; see also ARMOUR NEGRO-
PHOBIA, supra note 58 (discussing the presence of unconscious racism in the court-
room).
114. Sunnafrank & Fontes, supra note 1, at 11. The study also suggests that
"the reverse might hold when the defendant is a member of a racial group unasso-
ciated with the crime." Id.
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from there. 115 Because the stereotype is unspoken, it is not techni-
cally evidence in the case, and therefore not subject to objections,
or motions to strike. While some brave defense lawyers will argue
against the unspoken stereotype, perhaps using the "silent argu-
ments" technique of Binder, Bergman, and Moore, 116 in many
cases the argument against the application of the stereotype will
go unstated. The defendant is left at the mercy of the non-
prejudiced jurors who identify and wish to stop the others from
applying the stereotype, or from simply relying upon unconscious
racial bias in the case. Jurors who will successfully confront and
disarm the potential stereotype may be few and far between, de-
pending on the jurisdiction and the composition of the jury pool.
Now, if the 'little old lady" had been charged with poisoning a
male boarder, the stereotype from the popular play and film "Ar-
senic and Old Lace" may come to mind and the jurors similarly
may apply that stereotype to require less proof of poisoning in or-
der to reach the conclusion that she is guilty of poisoning the dece-
dent.11 7 In much the same way, a Latin of South American origin,
charged with drug smuggling, may receive the burden of stereo-
types about Latin American drug lords that becomes a shortcut on
the prosecution's path to proving this defendant's knowledge that
he was carrying illegal drugs.
2. The Special Case of Knowledge
Professor Morris identifies specialized knowledge as a per-
missible basis for Rule 404(b) evidence because there is no propen-
sity inference, stating that "[w]here a defendant denies technical
familiarity with a certain drug, evidence that the defendant earlier
had the technical knowledge at issue is relevant without assuming
the continuity of character across different events. This evidence
115. See, e.g., Armour Stereotypes, supra note 46, at 739 ("Americans share a
common historical and cultural heritage in which racism has played and still plays
a dominant role. Because of this shared experience, we also inevitably share many
ideas, attitudes, and beliefs that attach significance to an individual's race and in-
duce negative feelings and opinions about nonwhites.") (quoting Lawrence, supra
note 95, at 322).
116. ALBERT J. MOORE ET. AL, TRIAL ADVOCACY: INFERENCES, ARGUMENTS, AND
TECHNIQUES 80-82 (1996) ("Silent arguments are arguments the legal system does
not regard as rationally valid. They are 'silent' because legal rules prohibit you or
your adversary from explicitly articulating the inferences and generalizations un-
derlying the evidence supporting such arguments.").
117. Arsenic and Old Lace (Warner Bros. Pictures 1944) (depicting a pair of
seemingly sweet elderly women who have taken it upon themselves to end the suf-
fering of lonely old men by poisoning them with elderberry wine laced with arsenic
and various other toxins).
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does not rely on probabilistic reasoning or the doctrine of
chances." 118 This reasoning does not apply in "mere knowledge"
cases, where knowledge of material facts is simply the requisite
mental state element for the charged offense. 119 The existence of
specialized knowledge properly can be determined from the prior
bad acts. 120 A defendant who currently denies having specialized
knowledge of how to break into a safe, for instance, but admitted
(or was determined to have possessed) such specialized knowledge
in the past will be found to be more likely to continue to possess
that specialized knowledge of how to break into a safe. However,
the possession of specialized knowledge does not require a continu-
ing character trait because once knowledge is obtained, it is fair to
assume that the knowledge is maintained. 21 Leonard explains it
this way:
[Olne must infer that if the defendant had knowledge at a cer-
tain time, [the defendant] is likely to retain that knowledge at
the time of the charged event. However the "propensity" to re-
tain knowledge is nearly a universal human trait, and thus is
not governed by the "other crimes, wrongs, or acts" rule. Be-
cause it does not reflect negatively on the defendant's charac-
ter nor does it distinguish the defendant from other people, the
evidence is likely admissible. 122
Thus, when the prior bad act evidence is evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts involving the existence of specialized knowledge,
we are not relying upon a propensity proposition, but rather upon
an act with a true non-character, non-conduct in conformity pur-
pose.1 23
Leonard also has noted that the problem of propensity infer-
ences can still exist when knowledge is the asserted non-character
purpose.124 Leonard himself presents the contrary argument,
which he applies to certain cases involving knowledge, 125 as he dis-
118. Morris, supra note 34, at 204.
119. See generally id. at 190-96 (discussing the use of propensity reasoning in
the context of intent and other mens rea requirements).
120. Id. at 204.
121. Leonard, supra note 44, at 126.
122. Id.
123. Morris, supra note 34, at 204 (discussing the concept that where specialized
knowledge is the non-character purpose for the evidence, it does not rely upon the
propensity inference that the defendant is the kind of person who knows this sort of
thing, but rather, that he did know it previously and therefore still knows it now).
124. Leonard, supra note 44, at 118.
125. Id. (describing the English common law history of using uncharged miscon-
duct evidence to prove knowledge as an element of the crime on the grounds that
"proof that the defendant had [forged] other similar instruments in the past was
admissible to prove the defendant's knowledge that the instrument in question was
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cusses the various circumstances under which knowledge may be
relevant to an issue in a civil or criminal case. 126 He then articu-
lates an alternative rationale that:
The principle on which this species of evidence has been ad-
mitted in those cases, is, that it is frequently impossible, from
the insulated fact of the uttering of a single forged note, to as-
certain whether the accused knew it was forged or not.
Knowledge exists in the mind; and it is impossible, say the
courts, to become acquainted with the secret knowledge of an-
other, without referring to his conduct or his acts on other oc-
casions. 127
Where specialized knowledge is at issue and the uncharged
events are quite similar to the charged event, Leonard also recog-
nizes that the inferential step on knowledge is an easy one, thus
reducing the risk of unfair prejudice by a jury that misuses the
evidence for a propensity purpose. 128
Leonard uses the example of a defendant who had partici-
pated in a "complex scheme to import illegal drugs similar to the
scheme alleged in the present case"'129 to explain that:
For the evidence to be probative of the defendant's conduct, it
is necessary to infer that people who possess such knowledge
(as demonstrated by their behavior) are likely to use the
knowledge on more than one occasion. If the logic is followed
by the fact-finder, however, the character rule is not violated
because this inference is based on a morally neutral judgment
concerning the defendant rather than one based on the defen-
dant's character. A person who knows how to drive a car, for
example, will have a tendency to use that knowledge, regard-
less of the person's character. 130
Similarly, a person who knew how to drive a car in 2004,
likely still will know how to drive a car in 2006.
From the foregoing discussion, it seems that Morris and Leo-
nard's analyses of knowledge as non-propensity in purpose applies
forged.").
126. Id. at 119-20.
[Flor example, if a defendant is charged with receiving stolen goods, a
crime that requires proof that the person was aware the goods were sto-
len, evidence that the defendant had previously received similar goods
from the same source under the same circumstances would be relevant to
prove the defendant was aware that the goods [received] in the instant
case were also stolen.
Id.
127. Id. at 120 (quoting Walker v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. (1 Leigh) 574, 578
(1829)).
128. Id. at 124.
129. Id. at 166.
130. Id. at 167 (emphasis added).
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most readily to cases where specialized knowledge is being proven.
On the other hand, mere knowledge of past criminal behavior, or
of facts to support a particular mental state, such as the nature of
illegal drugs sold or obtained in the past, necessarily involves a
propensity inference, and thus should be excluded by the Federal
Rules of Evidence.131 Because of the stereotype of the "Latino drug
lords," this propensity danger is heightened when the defendant is
a Latino accused of a drug offense. Leonard explains that in many
cases the government will offer evidence of prior drug convictions
to prove both knowledge and intent in cases where the defendant
raises the "mere presence" defense when found in the company of
illegal drugs and drug paraphernalia. Leonard criticizes the in-
troduction of this evidence, stating that:
The relevance of the prior arrest and convictions most clearly
derives from an inference that a person who has been involved
with drugs on several other occasions is more likely than one
not so involved to have known that illegal drugs (of another
kind) were in a room he occupied. It is difficult to understand
how an inference that people who possess illegal drugs will
tend to continue to do so is not character-based. Even if one
can draw a non-character inference, the less intuitive reason-
ing behind such a theory is certain to be overwhelmed by the
more intuitive, but forbidden, reasoning. In cases in which the
uncharged misconduct differs substantially from the conduct
at issue, the argument for admissibility to rebut the "mere
presence" defense is even more difficult to justify.132
Thus, the farther we move from specialized knowledge and the
closer we get to generalized knowledge, the less likely it is that the
evidence will be used for a purpose other than propensity in prov-
ing the mental state of knowledge. Mere knowledge as a mental
state is also closely tied to two other allegedly non-propensity pur-
poses discussed above: absence of mistake and accidence.
The admission of prior bad acts evidence to show knowledge
of illegal drugs that confirms the stereotype of Latino drug dealer
will be problematic. The prosecution takes the benefit of the
shortcut provided by the stereotype, thus using the forbidden pro-
pensity reasoning to support the prosecution case. This reliance
could result in the triggering of stereotypical responses in the non-
prejudiced jurors and of prejudiced responses in the jurors whose
personal beliefs do allow for prejudice. These defendants will thus
be denied some benefit of the rules that require proof, with evi-
dence presented in court, of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
131. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
132. Leonard, supra note 44, at 144-45.
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On the other hand, there is an argument for admitting the
statements on the grounds that Professor Armour asserts: it is
necessary to force the jurors to confront the potential prejudices, in
order to trigger the "should" behavior, by bringing the appropriate
response into the level of consciousness, instead of relying upon a
habitual stereotypical response. 133 If the evidence is therefore ad-
mitted, on this theory or another, then the jury must have its non-
prejudiced personal beliefs activated.
D. Identifying Triggers for Positive Behavior: Activating
Non-Prejudiced Beliefs and Corresponding Behaviors
1. Curative Jury Instructions
It seems that Armour's argument in Color-Consciousness in
the Courtroom is most concerned with a "stop gap" measure, to
take advantage of those jurors who actually hold non-prejudiced
personal beliefs, by de-activating those things that trigger the ac-
tivation of learned stereotypes. In another article, Armour ex-
plains that, "conscious self-regulation, in a word, is the key."'134
Thus, he suggests that, "appeals to fact finders by attorneys repre-
senting members of stereotyped groups to resist succumbing to
automatic negative responses should not be barred by courts," be-
cause colorblindness "may often subvert the very purpose for
which it is applied."'135 His recommendation of some sort of cul-
tural meaning test, A la Charles Lawrence, provides interesting
insights into the significance of the jurors' stereotypical percep-
tions associated with particular behaviors, words, descriptions or
actions. Limiting instructions are one way to activate non-
prejudiced beliefs. For this reason, I propose several new jury in-
structions in the final section of this article, which can be used on
an experimental basis to develop data on how to prime or activate
non-prejudiced beliefs and behaviors.
There is a substantial debate among evidence scholars and
trial lawyers over whether limiting instructions serve any purpose
133. Jody D. Armour, Color-Consciousness in the Courtroom, 28 Sw. U. L. REV.
281, 287 (1999) ("[Cjonsciously adverting to a characteristic that automatically
triggers stereotypical responses is an effective strategy for avoiding unconscious
discrimination.").
134. Id.
135. Id. at 288; see also Jody Armour, Race Ispa Loquitor: Of Reasonable Racists,
Intelligent Bayesians, and Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 781, 786,
805-16 (1994) (developing a "constitutionally based rationale for excluding race-
based evidence and legal arguments.").
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whatsoever. It is further questioned whether they serve the in-
tended purpose of focusing the jury on the permissible uses of evi-
dence, and away from its impermissible uses.136 It is not likely that
the jury compartmentalizes any evidence so that its final decision
avoids consideration of any evidence it was instructed not to use
and is based solely upon the evidence that the jury instructions
stated were permissible. We expect that telling the jury to disre-
gard certain evidence only makes the jurors think about that piece
of evidence even more. 137 But do the jurors respond by trying to
comply with the judge's instruction, or by defying the instruction?
It is likely that juror studies will demonstrate the varied responses
that we might expect: that different jurors respond differently to
the judge's limiting instructions under different circumstances. 138
Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court has held that "[a]
jury is presumed to follow its instructions,"139 and therefore we can
accept this presumption to support the efficacy of at least some
jury instructions.
2. Admitting Additional Evidence to Counteract the
Implicit Racial References
To the extent that one discounts the utility or effectiveness of
curative jury instructions, another solution is needed. One poten-
tial avenue to consider is admitting additional evidence to counter
the implicit racial references. This additional evidence could in-
clude information about the defendant's character for peacefulness
if the violence stereotype is triggered. It could also include evi-
dence about the defendant as an individual, to disassociate him in
the jurors' minds from the group defined by the racial stereotype.
Much of this evidence is character evidence and thus is subject to
136. Compare PERRIN ET AL., supra note 12, at 351-52 (stating that limiting in-
structions are "worthless"), with Joel D. Lieberman, What Social Science Teaches
Us about the Jury Instruction Process 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 589, 603 (1997)
(stating that limiting instructions can be effective).
137. See PERRIN ET AL., supra note 12, 351-52 ("[L]imiting instructions are, for
the most part, worthless.").
138. See Jeffrey E. Pfeifer, Reviewing the Empirical Evidence on Jury Racism:
Findings of Discrimination or Discriminatory Findings, 69 NEB. L. REV. 230, 248
(1990) (finding several situations where racial differences in jurors responses "dis-
appeared, however, when subjects were given jury instructions").
139. Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234 (2000) (citing Richardson v. Marsh,
481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987)). But see Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135
(1968) ("[T]here are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or can-
not, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the




the limitation and dangers discussed in Section III below. Poten-
tial solutions to this dilemma are presented in Section IV.
III. The Effect of these Character Inferences and Negative
Stereotypes Cannot Be Overcome within the Existing
Federal Rules of Evidence
A. The Existing FRE Mechanism
Some would suggest that the Federal Rules of Evidence cur-
rently provide an adequate mechanism for dealing with racial ref-
erences, and that is the balancing test of Rule 403.140 While Rule
403 can provide some protection against such references, its pro-
tection is not sufficient. The Rule confirms that relevant evidence
should be admitted unless "its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,"14 1 and in many
such cases, the balancing test may weigh in favor of admitting the
evidence-perhaps with a limiting instruction, but admitting it
nonetheless. This balancing out is based on the probative value of
the evidence, and how much the objectionable evidence tends to
make more or less likely'some material fact at issue in the trial.
For instance, when the evidence goes to prove identity, or knowl-
edge, a high degree of similarity between the prior bad act (of
knowing how to break into a safe, for instance) and the current ac-
cusation (stealing something from a locked safe, for instance) in-
creases the probative value of that prior bad act evidence. Thus,
only a substantial degree of prejudicial effect can justify exclusion
of the objectionable evidence on Rule 403 grounds. When the iden-
tity element is based in part upon racial references (for example,
that the African American defendant has assaulted another person
under similar circumstances in the past) the probative value of the
prior bad act in proving that this defendant assaulted the victim in
the current case is increased when the jurors subconsciously apply
the stereotype of violence by African American males. The proba-
tive value remains high, and thus only a substantial prejudicial
effect can prevent admission of the evidence under Rule 403. The
prejudicial effect, however, is not likely to be any higher in a case
involving racial references, unless the court is confronted with the
stereotype, and forced to consider the potential effect of the un-
stated stereotype on the jurors' assessment of the evidence. This
140. FED. R EVID. 403.
141. Id.
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conscious assessment will show the additional potential for preju-
dice that might not exist if the defendant's race did not conform to
stereotypes associated with the crime charged.
1. Rule 404 and the General Prohibition Against the Use of
Character Evidence
The general rule is that evidence of a person's character is
not admissible to prove conduct in conformity with that charac-
ter.142 When we talk about character in the evidence context, we
are referring to a disposition to either engage in or to avoid certain
types of behaviors. A person has "character" or "character traits"
as to many different aspects of life. For example, a person may
have a character for truthfulness, a character for carefulness or
carelessness, a character for violence or peacefulness. We consider
this type of evidence all the time in our everyday lives, because it
is useful to explain, understand, or predict a person's behavior.
However, as a policy matter, Congress and state legislatures have
decided that character evidence should be excluded in all but a few
situations1 43
Character evidence can be used in different ways. For in-
stance, while it can be used to prove one's character or one's dispo-
sition, it can also be circumstantial evidence to help prove one's
conduct. 144 In the latter case, which also is referred to as use for a
propensity purpose, one's character is offered to prove that a per-
son acted in conformity with that character on a particular occa-
sion.145 All litigators know the importance of identifying the pur-
pose for which the evidence is being offered, because the character
evidence ban is triggered only when the evidence is offered to
prove conduct in conformity. 146
There are three basic forms of character evidence that can be
admitted at trial: (1) evidence describing specific instances of a
person's conduct to illustrate that person's character; (2) evidence
describing the witness' opinion of that person's character; and (3)
evidence describing that person's reputation in the community for
142. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a) ("Evidence of a person's character or a trait of
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity
therewith on a particular occasion .... ").
143. See FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee's notes (describing the rule's ra-
tionale).
144. MENDEZ EVIDENCE, supra note 13, at 46.
145. Id.




a particular character trait.147
Evidence of a specific instance is circumstantial evidence of
character. For instance, the fact that the defendant misrepre-
sented the value of the used car he sold to one individual would be
specific instance evidence of his character for overpricing used
cars. It is not direct evidence that he also overpriced the car at is-
sue in this litigation, but it tends to help prove that conclusion cir-
cumstantially by suggesting a character trait for dishonesty.
From this it can be inferred that the defendant was dishonest on a
past occasion, and thus likely overpriced the car on the present oc-
casion. As long as the current lawsuit contains allegations of
overpricing used cars, the prior act of overpricing a used car would
be relevant to the present case. The attorneys use the specific in-
stance character evidence to help prove that because the defendant
defrauded a customer before, it is likely that he is guilty in this in-
stance as well, simply because he is the kind of person who com-
mits this sort of act.
Consider Goldilocks and the likely cross-examination by the
prosecution in her later trial for breaking and entering the homes
of the Three Little Pigs: "You have broken into homes before, ha-
ven't you? In fact, you broke into the home of the Three Bears just
last year, isn't that right?" What is the inference that the attorney
wants the jury to draw? The inference is that Goldilocks is the
kind of person who breaks into homes, and thus she probably
broke into the Pigs' homes, just like she did with the Bears' home.
The jury will find the past behavior of Goldilocks relevant in help-
ing to decide whether or not she committed the current crime.
With opinion evidence, someone who is well acquainted with
the defendant can testify that in the witness' opinion, this defen-
dant is the kind of person who commits this kind of act.148 For ex-
ample, in the Goldilocks trial, Father Bear testifies, "I am well ac-
quainted with Goldilocks, having gotten to know her since the
break-in at our home, and in my opinion, she is the kind of person
who breaks into homes." What is the inference that the attorney
wants the jury to draw? The inference is that Goldilocks broke
into the Pigs' homes because someone who knows her well thinks
that she is the kind of person who breaks into homes. Evidence of
opinion is possibly even more circumstantial because it necessarily
relies upon a judgment call that the testifying witness has a
147. FED. R. EVID. 405.
148. MENDEZ EVIDENCE, supra note 13, at 47; see also FED. R. EVID. 405(a) (al-
lowing proof to be established by "testimony in the form of an opinion").
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proper basis upon which to form the opinion as to character. 149
Evidence of reputation contains a similar flaw because it is
really based upon what other people have said about the defen-
dant's character. 150 It amounts to a "mass opinion"-an amalga-
mation of opinions of individuals throughout the relevant commu-
nity.151 Reputation evidence is testimony by a witness who knows
the defendant's reputation in the social, professional, or business
community, and can state under oath that within that community,
the defendant has a reputation for a certain character trait.152 For
instance, the Hunter testifies, "I am out in the Woods every day,
and I have my finger on the pulse of the Woods, so to speak. I
know what is going on there and I hear a lot about Goldilocks.
And always when I hear about Goldilocks, it's about breaking and
entering. 'Did you lock your door?' someone will ask, 'Because I
hear Goldilocks is heading this way.' That is the sort of thing eve-
ryone is saying about Goldilocks." What is the inference that the
attorney wants the jury to draw? The inference is that Goldilock's
reputation means something, and if her reputation in the commu-
nity is as someone who breaks and enters other people's homes,
then it makes more likely the proposition that Goldilocks broke
into and entered the Pigs' home in this instance.
These three types of character evidence can be relevant be-
cause they make more likely some fact of consequence in the liti-
gation. So why do we exclude this evidence? The main reason ties
into one of the policies behind evidence laws, which is to foster the
smooth and orderly flow of trials, and to prevent trials from last-
ing forever.1 53 For instance, if a judge were to admit evidence of
what the defendant did to a previous car purchaser as a specific
instance illustrating his character for overpricing cars, then the
defendant would need to offer evidence to demonstrate that the
previous car was not overpriced. Thus, the price of the previous
car, as well as its value, would become an issue in the current
trial, and the amount of evidence to be presented would be dou-
bled, deflecting attention away from the issues that truly matter
149. MENDEZ EVIDENCE, supra note 13, at 48.
150. Reputation testimony is basically woven from numerous fibers of hearsay,
but the reputation as to character exception permits admission on that ground.
FED. R. EVID. 803(21).
151. I am indebted to my colleague Professor Carol Chase for articulating this
point so clearly.
152. MENDEZ EVIDENCE, supra note 13, at 47.
153. See FED R. EID. 102 ("These rules shall be construed to secure ... elimina-
tion of unjustifiable expense and delay .... ").
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in the underlying litigation. If additional evidence of reputation or
opinion is admitted, then contrary evidence on those points will be
offered as well, further multiplying the number of issues and wit-
nesses in the trial. This multiplication leads to a danger of the
undue consumption of time and resources, distraction of the is-
sues, and juror confusion. 54
In addition to juror confusion, there is also the risk of unfair
prejudice, given that the jurors may overvalue the character evi-
dence and find someone guilty of the pending charge simply be-
cause the jurors believe that the past instances occurred. 155 In
criminal trials, this consideration is especially important because
the American legal system is based on punishing people for their
wrongs if a jury of their peers makes a determination of those
wrongs beyond a reasonable doubt. 156 Professor Mendez explains
that "a major concern is that character evidence will tempt jurors
to apply a theory of culpability that is based on character rather
than on the commission of a punishable act."'157 We are supposed
to punish people for what the prosecution has proven that they
have done in this case, not for who they are nor for what they have
done in the past. 5 8
With that background information about the general prohibi-
tion under the Federal Rules, let us now examine how it plays out
with an example involving race. For instance, if a prosecutor was
trying to prove that a defendant of Italian American ancestry is
guilty of conspiracy charges under the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, 18 U.S.C. §1961-68, he might
try to offer evidence that the defendant had a reputation for being
"connected," and for associating with known members of organized
crimes syndicates. Such evidence would be excluded under Rule
404 as impermissible character evidence if it were offered in the
prosecution's case in chief. However, there are several exceptions
that can permit this testimony later in the case.
154. See Miguel A. Mendez, Character Evidence Reconsidered: "People do not
seem to be Predictable Characters," 49 HASTINGS L.J. 871, 888 (1998) ("The poten-
tial for extended inquiry into 'collateral' matters is mind-boggling.").
155. MENDEZ EVIDENCE, supra note 13, at 49.
156. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW (3rd ed.
2003), at 14 ("What is required is that the Government's proof exclude any reason-
able doubt concerning the defendant's guilt.").
157. MENDEZ Stable Personality, supra note 42, at 224.
158. Of course, three strikes provisions do provide some enhanced punishment
for past behaviors, and the United States Supreme Court has determined that it
does not violate due process when the prior convictions are not proven up to the
jury in the third strike case. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
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2. Exceptions to the Character Evidence Ban
There are several exceptions to the general character evi-
dence ban: (1) the common-law mercy rule;1 5 9 (2) when character is
an essential element of the claim, charge or defense in the litiga-
tion;160 (3) sex crimes exceptions; 161 and (4) exceptions for the im-
peaching and rehabilitating the credibility of testifying wit-
nesses. 162 The sex crimes exceptions to Rule 404(a) are included in
Rules 412-15, which deal with both civil and criminal cases of
rape, sexual assault, and child molestation, 163 and are beyond the
scope of this article's analysis. Character evidence about the
trustworthiness and credibility of witnesses is another exception,
and a discussion of that exception raises interesting additional is-
sues which are also beyond the scope of this article. 164
The first exception is the most pertinent to the analysis in
this article. The so called "mercy rule" allows a criminal defen-
dant to "throw himself on the mercy of the court," by offering evi-
dence of a relevant character trait that is inconsistent with the of-
fenses charged. 165  If the accused 166 offers such evidence, the
fairness provision is activated. The fairness provision provides
159. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1).
160. FED. R. EVID. 405(b).
161. FED. R. EVID. 412-15.
162. FED. R. EVID. 608-09.
163. A discussion of these exceptions is beyond the scope of this article. FED. R.
EVID. 412 ("Sex Offense Cases; Relevance of Alleged Victim's Past Sexual Behavior
or Alleged Sexual Predisposition"); FED. R. EVID. 413 ("Evidence of Similar Crimes
in Sexual Assault Cases"); FED. R. EVID. 414 ("Evidence of Similar Crimes in Child
Molestation Cases"); FED. R. EVID. 415 ("Evidence of Similar Acts in Civil Cases
Concerning Sexual Assault or Child Molestation").
164. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(3) ("Character of Witness"). Evidence of the character
of a witness, as provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609 (which address competence,
impeaching credibility, reputation for truthfulness, and impeachment by conviction
of crimes) is propensity evidence because the probative value of the evidence de-
pends on the inference that the person is more likely to lie on the witness stand
now because she has a weak character for truthfulness. Courts consider that the
witness, simply by taking the stand, is putting her character for truthfulness at
issue, and therefore, it is proper to permit the opposing party to inquire into her
character for truthfulness. The witness is not permitted to describe the specific
instances on direct under Rule 608(b). FED. R. EVID. 608(b).
165. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1) advisory committee's note to proposed amend-
ment ("In criminal cases, the so-called mercy rule permits a criminal defendant to
introduce pertinent character traits of the defendant and the victim.").
166. The advisory committee has approved amendments to the rules for the
character of the accused, Rule (404(a)(1), and character of the alleged victim, Rule
404(a)(2), to specifically state that they apply to a criminal case, and for the latter,
to exclude Rule 412 evidence. FED. R. EVID. 404(a) advisory committee's note to
proposed amendment. If Congress does not do anything to reject, modify or defer
implementation of these proposed rules, they will take effect on December 1, 2006.
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that after the accused presents such evidence, the prosecution has
the opportunity to rebut the good character evidence with other
opinion or reputation evidence of the defendant's bad character for
that particular trait.167 In addition, the Rules expressly permit
the lawyer to inquire into specific instances of the defendant's con-
duct that are inconsistent with the good character testimony.1
68
The mercy rule is perhaps a blessing and a curse because of the
fairness provision discussed further below.
An illustration of the process is useful here. First, during his
case in chief, the defendant presents the direct examination of a
character witness to say what a law abiding person the defendant
is known to be. On direct examination, the defense character wit-
ness is not permitted to testify about the specific examples of con-
duct that led him or her to conclude that the accused is not the
kind of person who would engage in a criminal conspiracy or that
the accused has no specific ties to organized crime. This is because
under Rule 405, one can inquire into specific instances only on
cross-examination, unless character is at issue.1 69  On cross-
examination the prosecution can ask the defendant's good charac-
ter witness about specific instances of the defendant's conduct for
167. FED. R. EVID. 404(a) states:
Evidence of a person's character or a trait of character is not admissible for
the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occa-
sion, except; (1) Character of the accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of
character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or
if evidence of a trait of character of the alleged victim of the crime is of-
fered by an accused and admitted under Rule 404(a)(2), evidence of the
same trait of character of the accused offered by the prosecution ....
Id.
168. FED. R. EVID. 405(a) states:
Reputation or opinion. In all cases in which evidence of character or a
trait of character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by testi-
mony as to reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion. On cross-
examination, inquiry is allowable into relevant specific instances of con-
duct.
Id.
169. Now that we have covered the exceptions, the next issue to consider is the
type of evidence that can be used to prove this character. Under the Federal Rules,
if the evidence is admissible, either as an issue in the litigation or otherwise, then
Rule 405 provides the allowable methods for proving character. When character is
at issue in the litigation, then the parties are permitted to use all three types of
evidence of character to prove that character. FED. R. EVID. 405. Examples of
character at issue include the following: in defamation actions to show a particular
trait or to mitigate damages; in wrongful death actions to show the decedent's pro-
pensity to provide support to family members, or lack thereof; in criminal cases in-
volving an entrapment defense, to show the defendant's inclination to engage in
certain illegal behaviors; and in wrongful discharge cases to show the employee's
unfitness for a particular job. See MENDEZ EVIDENCE, supra note 13, at 51.
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the limited purpose of proving how little the witness knows about
the defendant's reputation, or how baseless that opinion is. The
prosecution can further attempt to undermine the validity of the
good character testimony by inquiring into prior acts that demon-
strate bad character on that trait, such as past associations with
known members of organized criminal enterprises.
The prosecution must have a good faith basis for asking
about the specific instances, and is not supposed to just pull accu-
sations out of thin air.170 If the witness denies knowing about a
specific bad instance, then the prosecution may ask if being in-
formed would change the witness' direct examination testimony
about the good character of the accused, though the prosecution
may not extrinsically prove the specific bad acts.1 7' The witness is
then in a bind. Either she knew about those instances and disre-
garded them in saying what a great reputation the defendant has,
or she did not know about the instances, which calls into question
her personal knowledge and competency to testify about the de-
fendant's reputation in the community. Furthermore, it raises a
doubt as to her knowledge of the defendant's character based on
the unstated question: how well do you know the defendant's
character for being law-abiding if you do not know about these
prior acts? Thus, the prosecution has a substantial opportunity to
undermine, and even destroy, any benefit that the defendant
might have received from the testimony of the character witness.
In addition, now that the door has been opened to the use of char-
acter evidence, the prosecution can do affirmative damage as well,
by providing evidence of bad character traits such as associating
with known criminals, and frequenting the local pool hall that is
said to be "connected." For this reason, defendants and defense
attorneys must engage in a very careful assessment of the positive
and negative ramifications of using character testimony, and
whether to use character witnesses at all. Many conclude that the
benefits are substantially outweighed by the risks. 172
As a further corollary to the mercy rule, the Federal Rules
contain a similar rule about the character of the alleged victim in
criminal cases, which permits the defendant to offer evidence
about the character of the victim. 73 When the defendant offers
170. MENDEZ EVIDENCE, supra note 13, at 53.
171. Id.
172. PERRIN ETAL., supra note 12, at 312.
173. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2) states:
Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the alleged victim of the crime
offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence
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evidence about the character of the victim, then a similar fairness
provision takes effect. 174
A specific additional use applies in homicide prosecutions
when the defendant brings in any type of evidence that the victim
was the first aggressor.175 Any evidence, whether character or not,
about the victim being the first aggressor will open the door for the
prosecution to bring in good character evidence about the victim's
character for peacefulness. 176 Thus the defendant can open the
door to the victim's good character for peacefulness without ever
presenting character evidence, but merely by claiming self-defense
and that the victim was the first aggressor. 177 If the defendant of-
fers reputation or opinion character evidence about the victim's
character for striking first in physical altercations, then the door
will be opened for the prosecution to bring in opinion and reputa-
tion character evidence of the defendant's reputation for striking
first in physical altercations. 178 Moreover, the prosecution may
cross-examine this character witness with an inquiry into specific
instances of conduct of both the victim and the defendant to un-
dermine the witness' testimony during direct examination that fa-
vored the defense's case. 179
Continuing with our example, if the defendant opened the
door to his character for being a law-abiding citizen by offering
good character testimony about how he does not associate with
criminals or members of criminal organizations, then the general-
ized reputation or opinion evidence about the defendant's charac-
ter for associating with criminals and their enterprises would be
admissible in the defendant's criminal case to prove his conduct in
conformity with that character trait on a particular occasion. In
addition, on cross-examination of the defendant or his character
witness, the prosecution could inquire into specific prior instances
of a character trait of peacefulness of the alleged victim offered by the
prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the alleged victim
was the first aggressor.
Id.
174. Note, however, that if the defendant uses character evidence for a non-
character purpose (that is, not to prove action in conformity therewith) then the
door has not been opened, and the fairness provision does not yet apply, so the
prosecution does not then get to use character evidence of the defendant on that
same trait. FED. R. EVID. 404(a).
175. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. FED. R. EVID. 404(a).
179. FED. R. EVID. 405(a).
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of a violent nature.
3. Keeping Character Evidence Away from the Jury
There are only two ways to keep character evidence away
from the jury. The first is to avoid opening the door by declining to
offer any good character evidence, and the second is to prevail on
the Rule 403 objection by arguing that the probative value of the
past evidence of the defendant's violent behavior is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice due to the possibility
that the jury will decide the case based on the defendant's past
reputation for violent behavior.1 8 0 Evidence of prior violent acts
will trigger the violent African American stereotype because they
help to confirm the stereotype as it applies to the particular defen-
dant.18 1 In a similar way, when we have in the back of our minds
that most law professors are liberal, and we hear evidence that a
particular law professor was arrested in the 1960s for protesting,
that arrest helps to confirm the stereotype about liberal law pro-
fessors. Therefore, we are more likely to fill in the blanks by as-
suming that this law professor was arrested for protesting in favor
of a liberal cause, or against a conservative one.
The existing character evidence rules do not provide any
mechanism for disconnecting the evidence of prior violent acts
from the violent African American stereotypes, or liberal law pro-
fessors stereotype, in the minds of jurors (assuming a competent
witness who could truthfully testify to this fact), and thus the
rules need to be adjusted to account for this critical oversight.
B. While Contrary Evidence Effectively Counter Stereotypes,
in Most Cases, the Most Compelling Contrary Evidence
is Not Admissible
In everyday conversations, when we hear a stereotype and
wish to challenge it, we are able to do so by providing examples of
people who do not fit the stereotype. These examples undermine
the legitimacy of the stereotype by showing that it is less univer-
sal, and therefore less accurate as a depiction of a particular
group. For instance, to counteract the stereotype that African
Americans are stellar basketball players, we can find an African
180. With a less-damaging stereotype, for instance, that Asian American men
have great intellectual skills, the danger of unfair prejudice would be low (unless
the accused were on trial for masterminding a complicated criminal scheme to de-
fraud).
181. See discussion infra Part III.A.
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American who cannot make a two-point shot to save his life. To
counteract the stereotypes that African Americans are unintelli-
gent criminals, we can provide examples of intelligent, well-
educated African Americans who have no criminal records. The
real world is not the courtroom, however, so these counter-
examples can only be admitted at trial if they are relevant to the
issues to be decided in the case, and can be presented through the
testimony of a competent witness who can lay the appropriate
foundation. 182
One preliminary question is the relevance of the stereotype.
To the extent the stereotype is an explicit part of the argument,
the relevance will be clear. In most cases, however, the stereotype
will not be explicitly presented, or even called to attention during
the testimony, and thus there will not be the opportunity to estab-
lish that the stereotype is operating in the minds of the jurors.
Therefore, we need a mechanism for identifying the implicit evi-
dence that is operating in the minds of the jurors in order to set up
the opportunity to respond with the use of character evidence. If
the cultural meaning test identifies a stereotypical reference that
is based on race, then the remedial measures discussed below,
which include expanding the use of good character evidence with
specific instances, should be available to the criminal defendant
during his case in chief, or a sur-rebuttal.
Because conformance with the stereotype generally is not an
issue in the case (except perhaps in a discrimination case), the spe-
cific examples rarely will be admissible under the current rules.ls 3
Moreover, even if relevance could be established, to the extent that
people personifying these examples are not parties or witnesses in
the case, there will be no way to present the evidence through a
competent witness.18 4
The way to avoid the relevance objection is to focus the con-
trary showing on the particular defendant or witness individual to
demonstrate how he or she does not conform to the stereotype.18 5
The questions and responses that demonstrate his non-
conformance, however, will constitute character evidence-that he
is not the kind of person who is unintelligent, not the kind of per-
182. FED. R. EVID. 602.
183. FED. R. EVID. 405.
184. FED. R. EVID. 602.
185. See FED. R. EVID. 401 (stating the definition of "Relevant Evidence"); see
also FED. R. EVID. 402 (stating that relevant evidence is generally admissible and
irrelevant evidence is not admissible).
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son who commits crimes, or that he is not the kind of person who
can make shots from the free-throw line. If we try to limit the
questions to a non-character purpose, what would that purpose be?
The fact that a particular person does not have a particular char-
acter trait, and is therefore not likely to act in conformance with
that trait is really reverse propensity evidence. This explanation
is merely offered to prove conduct in conformity with the opposite
character trait of the stereotype, and therefore will nonetheless
constitute a propensity purpose.
Thus, the use of character evidence is necessary because the
only rebuttal for character manifestations of these stereotypes is
based on character evidence. Moreover, the most effective type of
character evidence to use is also the most prohibited form: specific
instances of conduct. While reputation and opinion evidence can
be a shortcut to establishing the character traits of law-abiding
nature, intelligence, and mediocre basketball playing, these types
of character evidence will necessarily be less convincing to the ju-
rors, because they are too vague to rebut the stronger generaliza-
tions contained in the well-known stereotypes. In contrast, the
specific good acts (maintaining a clean record, missing two point
shots, attending a well-respected academic institution, or earning
an advanced degree) would be useful to undermine the accuracy of
the stereotype and to show that the foundation for the generaliza-
tion is unsteady. In order to effectively counter the stereotype evi-
dence, the courts must make room to admit evidence of prior spe-
cific good acts that the defendant has performed, as Ross has
proposed, and which is discussed in the next section.18 6
C. Even When Good Character Evidence of the Defendant is
Admissible Under the Existing Rules, Presenting that
Evidence then Opens the Door to Additional Bad
Character Evidence
Under the existing Rules, the criminal defendant has the
open opportunity to offer good character evidence, in the form of
opinion and reputation testimony, on relevant character traits. 8 7
The defendant will be prohibited from offering his own prior good
acts because those would constitute evidence of specific instances,
and specific instances may only be inquired into on cross-
examination under the Federal Rules. 8 8 As every Evidence stu-
186. Ross, supra note 65, at 270, 278.
187. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1); FED. R. EVID. 405(a).
188. FED. R. EVID. 405(a). But see CAL. EVID. CODE § 1103(a) (2005) (allowing for
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dent knows, this strategic call can be very dangerous due to the
"fairness provision" which permits the prosecution to then offer
bad character evidence of the defendant on that particular charac-
ter trait. 189
Professor Ross has suggested a broad reform to permit wider
use of good character evidence without further opening the door to
the use of bad character evidence. 190 This reform advocates for the
admission of prior good acts evidence. 19' Ross characterizes three
main concerns with the use of character evidence in criminal law,
stating:
[F]irst, the right of good character evidence is a mirage. Sec-
ond, a good deal of evidence is now paraded before juries which
the jury is likely to use as proof of bad character even though
ostensibly it was admitted for reasons other than proof of bad
moral character. Third, many defendants have checkered
pasts or criminal records, even if they did not commit the
crime charged. This third factor may be inherent in our
criminal justice system, but it exacerbates the evidentiary im-
balances of the first and second factors. 9 2
Ross then discusses the various mechanisms for presenting
character evidence. 193 In most jurisdictions, good character evi-
dence is limited to evidence of opinion and reputation, two forms of
evidence which are not very probative. 9 4 Consider how easy it is
to get a friend, or the defendant's mother, to say that she thinks
the defendant is a peace-loving person.
Establishing the basis for knowledge of a defendant's reputa-
tion is a hurdle for many criminal defendants. 195 In order to estab-
lish that foundation, one must define the relevant community and
the witness' interactions with members of the community such
that the jury feels confident that the witness has some sort of basis
for articulating her views on the defendant's reputation. 196 Simi-
larly, opinion evidence requires an inquiry into the basis for the
opinion, including whether or not this is a reasonable opinion
specific instances of the victim's character to be introduced on both direct examina-
tion and cross examination).
189. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1).
190. See Ross, supra note 65, at 270.
191. Id. at 270, 278.
192. Id. at 236.
193. See id. at 232-42.
194. See id. at 237-38.
195. Id. at 237-39.
196. FED. R. EVID. 602 (establshing a personal knowledge requirement for wit-
ness).
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based on the available facts. 197 Because in federal court specific
instances of conduct may be inquired into only on cross-
examination (except in cases where character is at issue, which is
not the case in most criminal trials), the defendant cannot present
any specific instance character evidence in his case in chief.198
Without providing information about specific instances to "prick
the boil"199 so to speak, or to humanize the defendant, the good
opinion and reputation evidence falls flat as an obvious ploy to
curry favor with unconvincing testimony about the defendant's
good points. For these reasons, Ross recommends that the permis-
sible uses of good character evidence "be expanded to allow specific
instances of good character as well as opinion evidence."20 0 Per-
mitting admission of the good acts can bolster the basis for the
good reputation and opinion testimony, and thus provide a larger
benefit to criminal defendants than under the existing rules. 20 1
Returning to the current Federal Rules, the evidence of spe-
cific instances, albeit specific instances of bad character, is then
admitted on cross-examination to undermine the authenticity of
the reputation witness and to undermine the basis for the opinion
witness. 20 2 This use of specific instances of bad character more
than overcomes any beneficial effects that the accused may have
obtained from the admission of reputation and opinion good char-
acter evidence on direct examination in his case. 20 3 The Hunt and
Budensheim study found that:
[Sipecific bad acts cross-examination causes a backlash in
which jurors' judgments about the defendant become more
negative than they would have been in the absence of any
[character evidence]. Thus, not only do jurors misuse im-
peachment evidence to judge the defendant but also the spe-
cific negative information mentioned in cross-examination
outweighs the general positive information introduced by a
character witness. 20 4
With greater weight and admissibility, specific instance evidence
is a powerful tool for the prosecution. What is left for the defen-
197. Id.
198. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a).
199. PERRIN ET AL, supra note 12, at 17 (using the term "prick the boil" to de-
scribe the practice of exposing the weakness of one's case in order to persuade the
jury of one's commitment to truth).
200. Ross, supra note 65, at 270.
201. See id. at 270, 278.
202. FED. R. EVID. 405(a).




dant is reputation and opinion evidence. Ross notes that:
[A]s gatekeepers, judges sometimes exclude reputation evi-
dence because of insufficient foundation or because the time
period of that reputation is deemed too early or too late to be
relevant. Even where foundational requirements are met,
judges may still prevent character witnesses from taking the
stand by ruling that the [proffered] evidence is irrelevant to
the particular charge. 20 5
Thus, the criminal defendant has little countervailing evidence to
offer.
D. Jurors Give Greater Weight to Bad Character Evidence
than to Good Character Evidence
Whenever the defendant opens the door to character evidence
by offering evidence of his own good character, the fairness provi-
sion permits the prosecution to bring in more bad character evi-
dence. Jury studies have determined that jurors remember bad
character evidence more readily than good character evidence. 20 6
These studies also have concluded that jurors generally give
greater weight to bad character evidence. 207 While some would ar-
gue that the bad character evidence is more relevant to a determi-
nation about the guilt or innocence of the accused, that argument
seems to be based on a propensity inference as well: that those
who are accused of crimes are more likely to have committed
crimes. 20 8 Empirically, this may be often true, but it is no more
likely to be true than false in each individual case, because each
person is innocent until proven guilty. Based on the juror studies,
the admission of good character evidence likely will be outweighed
by the greater weight and volume of bad character evidence pre-
sented to the jurors.20 9 For this reason, a criminal defendant who
205. Ross, supra note 65, at 240 (footnote omitted). Ross further points out that
under Rule 608, evidence of honesty or credibility is not permitted unless the hon-
esty or credibility has been challenged. Thus prosecutors in many cases will argue
that because the crime at issue does not specifically involve honesty, but rather vio-
lence or some other charge, affirmative evidence of a good character for credibility
by reputation or opinion testimony also can be excluded. See id. at 241-42.
206. See Hunt& Budesheim, supra note 64, at 347-61.
207. See id.; see also Michael Lupfer et al., Presenting Favorable and Unfavor-
able Character Evidence to Juries, 10 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 59, 69 (1986) (finding
that jurors are "more influenced by unfavorable than favorable character evi-
dence").
208. MENDEZ EVIDENCE, supra note 13, at 46 ('The evidence discussed in this
chapter [character, habit and similar occurrences] is not restricted because it is ir-
relevant.").
209. See Hunt & Budesheim , supra note 64, at 347-61.
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opens the door to character evidence, seeking to counteract the
propensity inferences that the jurors will likely draw from prior
bad act evidence, is likely doing his case more harm than good.210
This asymmetry in the use of good and bad character evi-
dence by jurors during the decision-making process suggests that
any additional use of good character evidence should not open the
door to the admission of additional bad character evidence. Ross
recognizes jurors' tendency to give more weight to bad character
evidence, in part because of the values associated with particular
and past conduct. 211 She explains that "[i]n expanding good char-
acter testimony, it is imperative that no symmetrical loosening oc-
cur in the bad character rules."212 She continues, "[s]imply put,
the force of bad act evidence is much more powerful than the force
or affect [sic] of good act evidence. Hence, if character evidence
were freely allowed in for both sides this would unduly privilege
the government and unduly prejudice the defendant."213
As long as proper notice is provided, the prosecution in the
first instance can offer prior bad acts evidence for a non-
propensity purpose. 214 We have just examined the ways in which
these prior bad acts, when added to jurors' pre-existing racial
stereotypes, 215 produce a propensity inference,216 and operate as
character evidence on that issue. The bad character evidence is
particularly harmful when the defendant is charged with a crime
that conforms to that racial stereotype. The injustice is exacer-
bated when the defendant's only response is then to decide to offer
good character evidence to counter the propensity inferences that
the jury will inevitably draw, thus opening the door for the prose-
cution to offer bad character evidence on that particular trait.
All this reasoning leads to the crucial question: Should the
Federal Rules of Evidence provide a mechanism for admitting evi-
dence to counter the implicit stereotypes that the jurors already
210. See id. at 347.
211. See Ross supra note 65, at 273-75.
212. Id. at 275.
213. Id.
214. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
215. See generally Part II, supra (discussing how racial stereotypes factor into
juror analysis of evidence); see also Linda A. Foley & Minor H. Chamblin, The Ef-
fect of Race and Personality on Mock Juror's Decisions, 112 J. OF PSYCHOL. 47, 47-
51 (1982) (finding that mock jurors judge defendants of a race other than their own
more harshly, and most harshly when the victim is of the same race as the juror).
216. See Birt L. Duncan, Different Social Perception and Attribution of Inter-
group Violence: Testing the Lower Limits of Stereotyping Blacks, 34 J. OF
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 590, 597 (1976).
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will be applying? For instance, if evidence of stereotypical violence
by African Americans is admitted in an assault case involving an
Anglo victim and an African American male, then the defense
counsel may want to provide statistics about the low actual num-
bers of African American males who commit violent assaults cross-
racially. It is to this question that we now turn.
IV. Potential Solutions and Recommendations
A. Enforce the Ban on Admitting Evidence that Will Be
Used Only for the Propensity Purpose
Ross' proposal that courts no longer admit this Rule 404(b)
evidence under the guise of non-propensity purposes such as iden-
tity or intent is a reasonable solution to some of the problems iden-
tified in this Article. 217 Adopting this recommendation would limit
the jurors' consideration to the current circumstances of the case
and would shield the jurors from evidence of the prior conduct of
the defendant. Perhaps judges are giving too much discretion to
the jurors by permitting them to consider the evidence with an
admonition that they do not do so for an impermissible purpose. 218
Because we are not participants in the jury room, or "flies on the
wall," it is more difficult to ascertain whether or not the jury actu-
ally is using the evidence for a permissible chain of inferences, as
opposed to the impermissible propensity purpose. Prof. DiBiagio
is skeptical about how other crimes evidence is actually used by
jurors, stating, "the prosecution is free to troll for the jury highly
prejudicial and collateral evidence of the defendant's prior crimi-
nal acts. The result is a bewildering array of decisions admitting
other-crimes evidence without restraint."2 19 Thus, DiBiagio pro-
poses that Rule 404(b) be amended to limit its application to civil
cases only, and to provide for an additional Rule 404(c) to limit the
admission of other crimes evidence in criminal trials.220 DiBiagio
217. Ross, supra note 65, at 252.
218. DiBiagio, supra note 41, at 1240.
219. Id.
220. Id. DiBiagio further recommends that evidence admitted under Rule 404(b)
be limited o intrinsic evidence, which is evidence that is obtained directly from the
witness on the stand that is integral to the underlying criminal case. Id. Extrinsic
evidence, in contrast, is evidence that pertains to other matters not at issue in the
current criminal case. DiBiagio contends that the intrinsic evidence must be "(1)
relevant to an issue other than the defendant's character; and (2) possess probative
value that is not outweighed substantially by the danger of unfair prejudice ... "
Id. at 1243. The specific language of DiBiagio's new proposed Rule 404(c) is:
Evidence of other-crimes are not admissible to prove the character of the
[Vol. 25:1
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gives several permissible purposes for such intrinsic evidence. 221
Evidence that arises out of the same criminal episode will be con-
sidered,222 as would other evidence necessary to understand the
context or complete the story of the crime, 223 identity and motive
evidence, 224 and evidence that explains the nature of the relation-
ship between the parties. 225
Adopting such a limitation would reduce the other crimes
evidence admitted in criminal trials and would solve some of the
issues of jury confusion and reliance upon impermissible propen-
sity inferences. 226 DiBiagio's proposal would also help to alleviate
the misuse of non-propensity evidence for propensity purposes.227
Nevertheless, there are larger concerns with this prior bad act evi-
dence that this intrinsic act limitation does not address. One ma-
jor shortcoming of each of these proposals is that the jurors would
have to make their determinations based on less evidence, but the
benefit is that the courts would avoid violating the character evi-
dence ban.
Taking this proposal one step further, evidence of prior bad
acts that fit the racial stereotype should be excluded because the
chance of a propensity use by jurors is much more pronounced
than the chance that the jurors will abide by the limiting instruc-
tion and only use the evidence for a permitted purpose. This is
defendant in order to show action in conformity therewith. Intrinsic evi-
dence of other-crimes is admissible. Extrinsic evidence is not admissible.
The prosecution shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or dur-
ing trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the
general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.
Id.
221. Id. at 1244-46.
222. Id. at 1244 ('[W]hen it is clear that particular acts of the defendant are part
of, and thus inextricably intertwined with, a single criminal transaction, the courts
should admit the other-crimes evidence.").
223. Id. at 1246.
224. Id. at 1249. DiBiagio then focuses on identity evidence for meeting one of
three general categories, which include:
(1) evidence of other-crimes that connects a defendant to the charged of-
fense by showing a common or shared method of operation or signature; (2)
evidence of other-crimes that links the defendant to the charged offense by
establishing a motive for committing the crime; and (3) other-crimes evi-
dence that is direct evidence that the defendant committed the charged of-
fense.
Id. DiBiago further explains that "[i]ntrinsic evidence is particularly appropriate
in conspiracy prosecutions where the government's case is typically dominated by
accomplice testimony." Id. at 1251.
225. Id. at 1250-53.
226. See id. at 1253-54.
227. See id.
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particularly true in cases where identity, intent, and absence of
mistake or accident are the non-character purposes because this
evidence ends up being used for a propensity purpose. 228 More-
over, this misuse cannot be remedied with the admission of good
character evidence under the existing framework without opening
the door to the admission of additional bad character evidence. 229
As discussed above, jurors will give more weight and credibility to
the bad character evidence anyway, and thus the good character
evidence will have little, if any, overall impact in balancing the
scales of justice.230 Where the other crimes evidence is nonetheless
admitted, the following proposed limiting instruction should be
given to the jurors in order to activate non-prejudiced personal be-
liefs:
When I instruct you that certain evidence can be used for
one particular purpose and not for another purpose, it is
important that you pay close attention to my instruction.
When the evidence is information about prior bad acts of
the defendant, you must be especially careful to avoid creat-
ing generalizations about the defendant. A generalization
would be a statement that because someone acted a certain
way in the past, it is more likely that he or she acted that
same way in the case before you. Because people depend
upon generalizations in everyday life, it may be difficult for
you to ignore generalizations when you deliberate. How-
ever, it is imperative that you do so.
While this proposed instruction may not solve all of the problems,
it is a start towards activating non-prejudiced personal beliefs that
will remind the jurors to decide the case based on the evidence be-
fore them, instead of generalizations about how people behave.
Similar instructions could be used when a reputation or opinion
character witness is impeached with prior bad acts.
B. Provide a Mechanism for Identifying Implicit Racial
Stereotypes, to Curtail their Use When Possible, and to
Govern their Use When Impossible to Prevent
Although Rule 404's character evidence ban can prevent ad-
mission of the most blatant stereotypes, the existing character
evidence rules do not provide any other way to determine which
228. Cf. Hunt & Budesheim, supra note 64, at 347-61 (concluding that a defen-
dant's use of character evidence often causes a "backlash" because the prosecution
is allowed to cross examine the defendant about specific acts).
229. FED. R. EVID. 404(a).
230. See Hunt & Budesheim, supra note 64, at 347-61.
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prior acts or character evidence references are inappropriate as
evoking negative racial stereotypes. 231 Therefore, defense lawyers
must hang all of their hopes on Rule 403.232 Recognizing that
some evidence simply should be inadmissible without regard to a
balancing test, Federal Legislators created several policy exclu-
sions, including those for withdrawn guilty pleas,233 and offers to
provide humanitarian aid. 234 With this in mind, why not have a
specific racial reference exclusion as well? This racial reference
exclusion would apply in all criminal cases in which race is not at
issue (for instance this exclusion would not apply in hate crime
prosecutions). The proposed text of the Racial Reference Exclusion
Rule is as follows:
Evidence of the race of a defendant, or that of a defense or
prosecution witness, in the form of stereotypes or generaliza-
tions or otherwise, is not admissible in a criminal trial, unless
race is an essential element of, or defense to, the criminal
charges. Other evidence of racial stereotypes or generaliza-
tions is likewise inadmissible. This rule will not prohibit the
use of any racial inference that is drawn from the direct obser-
vations of the defendant and witnesses in court. When evi-
dence of race is admitted inadvertently, or in the discretion of
the court, then the defendant will be entitled to the following
relief, in the discretion of the court: (a) a curative jury instruc-
tion explaining the permissible and impermissible uses of race
in the jury deliberation process; (b) an opportunity to present
evidence to counter the racial stereotype now that the prosecu-
tion has opened the door; or (c) in extreme cases, a mistrial.
This language would give defense attorneys a firm basis for
objecting to the use of racial references and to the indirect use of
racial generalizations and stereotypes. This will allow the prose-
cution to make an offer of proof as to the permissible non-racial in-
ferences based upon the evidence. The judge can then make an in-
formed ruling after considering the racial implications of the
231. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a).
232. See FED. R. EVID 403 (excluding evidence if "its probative value is substan-
tially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or mis-
leading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence").
233. See FED. R. EVID. 410; see also FED. R. EVID. 408 (excluding evidence of of-
fers to compromise to prove liability or invalidity of a claim or its amount); FED. R.
EVID. 410 advisory committee's notes (indicating that evidence of guilty plea(s) is
excluded to promote the use of plea negotiations).
234. See FED. R. EVID. 409; see also FED. R. EVID. 409 advisory committee's notes
(excluding evidence of payment of medical expenses because "such payment[s] or
offer[s] [are] usually made from humane impulses and not from an admission of




evidence. While the rule could limit its prohibition to the use of
racial generalizations and stereotypes only for "conduct in confor-
mity" purposes, such a limitation might open the door to further
use of non-propensity evidence that actually ends up being used
for a propensity purpose.
If the judge rules that the evidence is not admissible, then
some version of the following curative instruction should be given:
You have just heard testimony that impermissibly referred to
racial or ethnic matters which are not relevant to your deter-
mination of the charges in this trial. I have ordered that the
testimony be stricken from the court record, and I hereby ad-
monish you to wipe this testimony from your minds, so that it
has no bearing whatsoever on your deliberations at the con-
clusion of this trial. Remember that each defendant is entitled
to a fair trial, regardless of his race or ethnicity. Continue to
keep an open mind as you listen to the rest of the evidence.
If the racial reference is not testimony, but rather a state-
ment, question, or argument of counsel, then there is still a need
for a curative instruction. This is because appellate courts have
declined to reverse decisions involving blatant racial references
about African American witnesses "shucking and jiving," and a
statement of "who are you going to believe in this case? It is abso-
lutely black and white," when the defense witnesses were black. 235
Under these circumstances, some version of the following instruc-
tion should be given to the jurors:
Remember that the statements, questions and arguments of
counsel are not evidence in this trial. You have just heard a
statement/argument/question from counsel that referred to ra-
cial or ethnic stereotypes or generalizations. Those stereo-
types or generalizations are not evidence in this trial, and
must be disregarded when you deliberate at the conclusion of
this case. Jurors are forbidden from relying upon racial and
ethnic stereotypes in reaching their verdicts. Each defendant
is entitled to a fair trial, regardless of his race or ethnicity.
Continue to keep an open mind as you listen to the rest of the
evidence.
These curative instructions will help to activate non-prejudiced
personal beliefs, so that juror decision making can focus on the
facts at issue in the case, and not upon impermissible racial
stereotypes.
C. Expand the Admission of Good (Racial) Character
235. Johnson, supra note 95, at 322 (noting that the "uncertainty about which
uses of race in credibility determinations are forbidden and which are not have fur-
ther hampered regulation of biased arguments about credibility").
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Evidence When Implicit Racial Stereotypes Have Been
Admitted
Professor Ross' proposal to provide a mechanism for admit-
ting additional good character evidence in criminal trials would
help address the imbalance between the influence and good and
bad character evidence, 236 but will not solve the problem as long as
the existing rules on the use of bad character evidence are main-
tained. Arguably, constricting the limits on bad character evi-
dence even further and admitting more good character evidence
would further remedy the imbalance.
The next step is to focus this additional character evidence on
evidence that pertains to racial references, or evidence that coun-
teracts implicit inferences about racial conduct, behavior, and
stereotypes. It would be a reverse fairness provision, permitting
the accused to provide counter-stereotypical evidence to counter-
act, in fairness, the racial implications and inferences raised by
the prosecution. This simple extension of the fairness provision of
the mercy rule could help to equalize the current imbalance in the
use of character evidence by criminal defense attorneys and prose-
cutors. The text of this proposed rule is as follows:
The use of racial references, either through the testimony of
witnesses, or the questions or argument of counsel is not ad-
missible except: (1) where it is admitted in the discretion of
the court; (2) upon the opposing party's failure to make a
timely objection; or (3) to rebut such evidence or argument
admitted under (1) or (2) above. Where the evidence is in the
form of witness testimony, or counsel's questions, the defense
will have the opportunity to rebut such evidence through addi-
tional re-cross or re-direct examinations of the witness, as well
as through the testimony of additional witnesses in the discre-
tion of the court. Where the references are brought to the at-
tention of the jury through closing argument or other argu-
ments of counsel, the defense will have the opportunity to
present a sur-rebuttal argument to the jury to address the ra-
cial references.
If the prosecution uses evidence of explicit racial references,
implicit racial references (as defined by the cultural meaning test
discussed above), or evidence that relies upon racial inferential
chains, then the defendant gets the opportunity, in his case in
chief, new sur-rebuttal, or closing argument, to present positive
racial character evidence. Providing the defense attorney a sur-
rebuttal case would be something prosecutors would want to avoid
236. See Ross supra note 65, at 270, 278.
2007]
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at almost any cost to prevent granting the defendant the advan-
tage of presenting the last word in the trial.
In addition, the prosecution may be reticent to use such evi-
dence in its case in chief because that will open the door for the de-
fendant to respond and offer additional evidence of good character,
which otherwise would not be relevant to the case. This reverse
fairness provision would curtail the prosecution's use of racial ref-
erences, perhaps in a way similar to the way in which the current
character rules curtail the defendant's ability to use the mercy
rule.237 At some point, we may obtain parity in the use of charac-
ter evidence by prosecutors and criminal defendants, and we may
reduce the number of racial references that are admitted into evi-
dence and form the basis for biased and unjust juror decisions.
D. Use New Form Limiting Instructions in Conjunction
With Other Jury Instructions When a Defendant is
Accused of a Crime that Conforms to Racial Stereotypes.
Taking Ross' proposal one step further,238 courts and legisla-
tures should consider a rule that provides for a special curative
jury instruction when arguably inappropriate racial evidence, in-
ferences, or arguments reach the jury. These limiting instructions
would seek to activate the non-prejudiced belief systems of the ju-
rors, and to counteract the stereotypes that have been activated
with the improper racial references. 239 By focusing the jurors on
consciously addressing the issue of bias and prejudice, as Armour
would likely agree, the court system will be on the road to dimin-
ishing the use of improper racial references in criminal trials.240
Another option would be simply to provide a non-bias instruc-
tion to all jurors as a standard part of the jury instructions for
each case, similar to the burden of proof or credibility instructions
that many courts use.241 A model instruction for witness testi-
mony generally would be as follows:
In the course of this trial, you may hear testimony from wit-
nesses who are members of racial or ethnic groups different
237. See id.
238. See id.
239. See Johnson, supra note 235, at 322.
240. See Amour Stereotypes, supra note 46, at 733 (suggesting that courts do not
often allow an attorney to bring the issue of prejudice into a trial, thereby allowing
for attorneys to play to the prejudices of the jury).
241. See, e.g., 7TH CIR. FED. JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 1.01 (West 1999) (instructing
jurors that they "should not be influenced by any person's race, color, religion, na-
tional ancestry or sex").
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from your own. It is important for you to avoid considering
their race or ethnicity as you evaluate the weight and credibil-
ity of their testimony. Be sure to give their testimony the
weight you deem appropriate, without regard to their race or
ethnicity.
The criminal defendant also deserves a modified version of
the above instruction that omits any reference to whether or not
he will testify in the trial. The following language may be used to
activate non-prejudiced personal beliefs:
In this trial, the defendant may have a racial or ethnic back-
ground that is different from your own. You should not draw
any inferences about the defendant's behavior based on the de-
fendant's race or ethnicity. Remember that each defendant is
entitled to a fair trial, regardless of the race or ethnicity of the
defendant, or of any alleged victim. Keep an open mind as you
listen to the evidence.
While preliminary instructions such as these may only have a
limited impact, they may help to prime the jurors to consider the
evidence fairly, by motivating the "should" behavior, and avoiding
the "would" behavior that sometimes creeps in unconsciously. 242
Using these instructions on an experimental basis in a fewcrimi-
nal courts also could provide some empirical evidence about the
efficacy of these types of curative instructions.
Conclusion
Character evidence is dangerous precisely because it is so
convincing. If we are to take seriously the character evidence ban,
based on the potential prejudice that results from decisions based
on character rather than conduct, then we must truly enforce the
ban on character evidence, and close the window to the admission
of prior bad acts that actually encourage the forbidden propensity
inferential chains. This danger is especially pernicious when im-
plicit and explicit racial references suggest racial stereotypes and
generalizations, which some jurors then unconsciously employ in
their decision-making process. The racial generalizations operate
as another form of bad character evidence, particularly when the
defendant is of a race that is associated with the charged crime.
Where the defendant's race corresponds to racial stereotypes about
the charged crime, judges must take special precautions to address
the influence of implicit biases and explicit stereotypes. This will
ensure that each criminal defendant is judged by the jurors based
on the elements of the crime, and not based on the content of his or
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